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Theorists are unable to agree about how to define medical
futility. Some define futility in terms of whether the treatment will
have a desired effect or promote the patient's goals, however
minimally defined, while others define futility in terms of whether the
treatment will help a patient achieve a certain objective level of
functioning. Those opting for the latter definition disagree about
how high a degree of expected functioning is required before the
treatment will be considered nonfutile. Some suggest that nonfutile
treatment must afford the patient a chance of leaving the hospital,
whereas others believe that a treatment is nonfutile as long as it may
* Associate Professor, Capital University Law School. B.A., Harvard College; Ph.D.,
University of Chicago; J.D., Stanford Law School. I would like to thank George Cronheim
for his helpful discussions of these and related issues.
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produce some benefit such as additional minutes of nonconscious
life.
The futility debate is further complicated by the numerous
justifications that are offered for the competing positions-for
example, autonomy, best interests, and efficient allocation of
resources. While it is unlikely that the debate will or even can be
resolved anytime soon, the issues would be clarified and the debate
furthered if theorists were more careful about the implications and
nonimplications of the various positions and justifications. Further, it
would be helpful if theorists would situate their futility discussions
within the context of other treatment practices. Thus, when
discussing whether individuals should be able to demand the care
that, even if completely successful, would not restore the patient to
consciousness, commentators would do well to keep in mind that
other treatments, which may in fact offer patients their only hope for
conscious survival, may nonetheless be denied.
Part I of this Article discusses In re Baby K and suggests that the
reasoning offered by the district court and the criticisms of the court's
decision have implications for the appropriate conception of medical
futility, because they illustrate some of the common mistakes in
offering an analysis of that term. Part II discusses the competing
conceptions of futility and suggests that the analyses and justifications
are often unpersuasive, at least in part, because they fail to situate the
discussion within the context of other kinds of treatment that patients
desire but are refused nonetheless. Part III addresses how futility
impacts patient autonomy. As long as medical futility is defined
appropriately, it is neither empty of content nor infringing upon
patient autonomy.
I. IN RE BABY K
In re Baby K focused national attention on the issue of medical
futility.2 In Baby K, an anencephalic child had received mechanical-
ventilator treatment and was likely to need continued treatment in the
1. 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994).
2. See Let Baby K Die in Peace, HARTFoRD CouRANT, Oct. 7, 1994, at A18, available in
1994 WL 7005735 (suggesting that keeping Baby K alive "makes no ethical sense"); Karen
R. Long, Whose Life Is It, Anyway ? Debate Rages on Baby K: Kept Alive for Two Years, Child
Cannot See, Hear, Think or Feel, PLAsN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 9, 1994, at 1A, available in
1994 WL 7230789 (discussing the lack of consensus with respect to whether treatment for
Baby K would be futile); When Care Is Futile, Let Go, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 1994, at 10A,
available in 1994 WL 11070849 (suggesting that treating Baby K was "a tragic exercise in
medical futility").
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future.' The hospital where the infant received the respiratory ther-
apy petitioned for a declaratory judgment absolving the hospital of
liability under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (EMTALA) 4 if the hospital refused to provide ventilator treatment
when Baby K next experienced respiratory distress. The hospital
made clear that its request was not based on financial considerations
but, instead, on its belief that such treatment would be medically inap-
propriate.' Anencephalic infants are inflicted with a disease that is
invariably fatal;6 such infants are incapable of consciousness 7 and are
therefore unable to see, hear, or feel.8
While the guardian ad litem and the father of the child agreed
that mechanical-ventilator treatment should not be given, the mother
did not. She opposed the discontinuation of ventilator treatment
both because she believed that all human life has value and because
she hoped that God might decide to work a miracle.'
The Baby K district court held that federal law prevented a hospi-
tal from refusing to treat an anencephalic infant, even if that treat-
ment would be futile.10 However, the court also suggested that the
relief of the respiratory distress of an anencephalic child was not futile
care. 1 When affirming the judgment of the lower court, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit implied that it was not relevant that the
prevailing standard of medical care might not require that respiratory
assistance be given to an anencephalic child, because the plain lan-
guage of EMTALA required that such treatment be given in any
event.
2
3. Baby K 832 F. Supp. at 1025-26.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
5. Baby K 832 F. Supp. at 1025-26.
6. See In reT.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 589 (Fla. 1992) (explaining that anencephaly is "a
birth defect [that is] invariably fatal").
7. See Charles R. DiSalvo, Worshipping at the Altar of Technique: Manic Aggressive Medicine
and Law, 40 ViL. L. REv. 1365, 1365 (1995) (explaining that Baby K was incapable of any
consciousness).
8. Baby Y, 832 F. Supp. at 1025; Robert D. Cantwell, Note, An Anencephalic Child Kept
Alive Through the Fourth Circuit's Interpretation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act: A "Medical Miracle" or a "Living Corpse"?, 14 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 323, 323
(1994).
9. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1026.
10. Id. at 1027 ("The plain language of the statute requires stabilization of an emer-
gency medical condition. The statute does not admit of any 'futility' or 'inhumanity'
exceptions.").
11. Id. ("The use of a mechanical ventilator to assist breathing is not 'futile' or 'inhu-
mane' in relieving the acute symptoms of respiratory difficulty." (emphasis omitted)).
12. The Fourth Circuit explained:
[The Hospital] maintains that a requirement to provide respiratory assistance
would exceed the prevailing standard of medical care. However, the plain lan-
19981
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A. EMTALA
EMTALA requires that hospitals provide stabilizing treatment to
individuals who come to emergency rooms requiring emergency treat-
ment. l" The Act was passed to prevent hospitals from "dumping"
their patients, i.e., either denying care altogether or transferring pa-
tients without stabilizing them.14
The Baby K district and appellate courts held that EMTALA re-
quires that treatment be given to nonindigent patients like Baby K15
Arguably, that statutory interpretation was incorrect, because, as
courts and commentators have suggested, EMTALA "was designed to
protect the rights of indigent patients only."16 In the case involving
Baby K, the hospital was not motivated by financial considerations but,
instead, by the belief that treating Baby K would involve the provision
guage of EMTALA requires stabilizing treatment for any individual who comes to
a participating hospital, is diagnosed as having an emergency medical condition,
and cannot be transferred .... [W]e cannot ignore the plain language of the
statute.
In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 596 (4th Cir. 1994).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (1) (1994) ("If any individual (whether or not eligible for
benefits under this subchapter) comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that the
individual has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide... such further
medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condi-
tion."); accord Baby IY, 832 F. Supp. at 1026 (interpreting EMTAIA as requiring "that partic-
ipating hospitals provide stabilizing medical treatment to any person who comes to an
emergency department in an 'emergency medical condition' when treatment is requested
on that person's behalf").
14. See Elizabeth A. Larson, Note, Did Congress Intend to Give Patients the Right to Demand
and Receive Inappropriate Medical Treatments?: EMTALA Reexamined in Light of Baby K, 1995
Wis. L. REv. 1425, 1431 (arguing that Congress passed EMTALA to ensure that patients
receive sufficient care regardless of their financial situations).
15. Baby /X 16 F.3d at 596 ("[T]he plain language of EMTAIA requires stabilizing
treatment for any individual who comes to a participating hospital, is diagnosed as having
an emergency medical condition, and cannot be transferred." (emphasis added)); Baby K,
832 F. Supp. at 1026 ("EMTALA requires that participating hospitals provide stabilizing
medical treatment to any person who comes to an emergency department." (emphasis
added)).
16. ZaiKaner v. Danaher, No. 4-89-749, 1990 WL 264721, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 21,
1990); accord Larson, supra note 14, at 1431 ("Congress passed EMTAIA for the express
purpose of ensuring that those who seek emergency room medical services receive ade-
quate care, regardless of their ability to pay."); Scott B. Smith, Note, The Critical Condition of
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act: A Proposed Amendment to the Act After In
the Matter of Baby K, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1497 (1995) ("As the legislative history
reveals, there is no question the legislative purpose behind EMTALA was to prohibit Medi-
care hospitals from dumping patients due to an improper economic motive."). But see
Urban v. King, 783 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D. Kan. 1992) (mem.) ("Although the legislative
history of the statute reflects a concern with the treatment of uninsured patients, the stat-
ute, itself, draws no distinction between persons with or without the means to pay for medi-
cal care.").
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of (what the hospital considered) inappropriate care.17 Thus, some
commentators suggest that EMTALA was simply inapplicable because
the rights of an indigent patient were not at issue.18 Other commen-
tators have argued that other federal statutes more precisely ad-
dressed the facts at issue in Baby K and that those statutes would not
have required treatment in that case.19
One set of issues involves whether Baby K was rightly decided-
for example, whether EMTAIA was applicable or whether EMTALA
was rightly interpreted. Insofar as those issues involve a dispute about
congressional intent, the relevant difficulties could be resolved if Con-
gress would clarify what it intends EMTAILA to include;2 ° for example,
Congress could pass an amendment specifying that the Act is in-
tended to apply only to indigent care.
21
A different set of issues involves whether Baby K has any bearing
on the multitude of situations in which EMTALA is not implicated,22
especially for those jurisdictions that limit the applicability of EM-
TALA to cases involving patient dumping.23 Baby K might seem to
17. Baby / 832 F. Supp. at 1025.
18. See Larson, supra note 14, at 1454-55 ("Under the indigent-and-uninsured-only rule,
this case would not have been decided by EMTALA." (footnote omitted)).
19. See Cantwell, supra note 8, at 342-43 (suggesting that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995), and its accompanying regulations should have
controlled the judgment in Baby K which, in turn, should have allowed the termination of
the aggressive treatment of the infant); David Zell Myerberg, Comment, The Fourth Circuit's
Baby K Decision: "Plain Language" Does Not Make Good Law, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 397, 408-09
(1995) (claiming that EMTALA was not meant to overrule the Child Abuse Amendments
of 1984, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106g(6) (West Supp. 1997), which permit a physician to withdraw
care if she determines that further care is futile).
20. See Baby K 832 F. Supp. at 1027 (suggesting that the argument for an EMTALA
futility exception "should be directed to the U.S. Congress, not to the Federal Judiciary").
21. See Smith, supra note 16, at 1530 ("Congress should amend EMTALA to protect
only indigent and uninsured patients.").
22. See Erin A. Nealy, Comment, Medical Decision-Making for Children: A Struggle for Au-
tonomy, 49 SMU L. REv. 133, 157 (1995) (discussing "situations that do not implicate the
EMTALA").
23. See, e.g., Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 435-36 (D. Kan. 1990) (limiting EM-
TALA to its anti-dumping objective); Nichols v. Estabrook, 741 F. Supp. 325, 329 (D.N.H.
1989) (holding that EMTALA applied exclusively to cases of patient dumping); Evitt v.
University Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495, 497 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (refusing to extend EM-
TALA beyond its legislative purpose of preventing hospitals from turning away patients for
economic reasons); cf Larson, supra note 14, at 1431 ("Congress passed EMTALA for the
express purpose of ensuring that those who seek emergency room medical services receive
adequate care, regardless of their ability to pay."); Smith, supra note 16, at 1497 ("As the
legislative history reveals, there is no question the legislative purpose behind EMTALA was
to prohibit Medicare hospitals from dumping patients due to an improper economic mo-
tive."). But see Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that
the fact that the Act was an anti-dumping bill "does not subtract from its use of the broad
term 'any individual'"); Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1991)
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have no implications for the issue of concern here, namely, an explo-
ration of the concept of medical futility. Yet, appearances notwith-
standing, given the court's interpretation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),24 Baby K may have important implica-
tions for non-EMTALA cases and for the concept of medical futility.
B. ADA
The Baby K district court offered another reason to reject the per-
missibility of refusing to treat Baby K, noting that "the ADA does not
permit the denial of ventilator services that would keep alive an
anencephalic baby when those life-saving services would otherwise be
provided to a baby without disabilities at the parent's request."25
Thus, the court argued that the ADA prohibited providing ventilator
support for one infant and not another, if the basis of that differentia-
tion was that the latter was anencephalic and the former was not.26
Commentators have suggested that the Baby K interpretation of
the ADA was incorrect; these commentators argue that the compari-
son was inapposite because the infant without disabilities would pre-
sumably not need ventilator support.27 However, if the Baby K district
court's interpretation of the ADA was in error, that cannot be estab-
lished by simply pointing out that a person without a disability would
not be in need of assistance.28 That kind of argument does not help-
(stating that because EMTALA unambiguously includes nonindigents, courts need not
consult the legislative history to determine coverage); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare
Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Though the Emergency Act's legislative his-
tory reflects an unmistakable concern with the treatment of uninsured patients, the Act
itself draws no distinction between persons with and without insurance. Rather, the Act's
plain language unambiguously extends its protections to 'any individual' who seeks emer-
gency room assistance."); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 269
(6th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the contention that the Act only applies to indigents).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
25. Baby K 832 F. Supp. at 1029. But see E. Haavi Morreim, Futilitarianism, Exoticare, and
Coerced Altruism: The ADA Meets Its Limits, 25 SETON HALL L. Rv. 883, 924-25 (1995) (offer-
ing a different reading of both EMTALA and the ADA).
26. Baby K 832 F. Supp. at 1029.
27. See, e.g., Giles R. Scofield, Medical Futility Judgments: Discriminating or Discriminatory ?,
25 SETON HALL L. REV. 927, 942 (1995) (arguing that if Baby K "did not have her disability,
she would not have needed the treatment in question").
28. Compare one court's conclusion:
[A] plaintiff must prove that he or she was discriminatorily denied medical treat-
ment because of the birth defect and, at the same time, must prove that, in spite
of the birth defect, he or she was "otherwise qualified" to receive the denied med-
ical treatment. Ordinarily, however, if such a person were not so handicapped,
he or she would not need the medical treatment and thus would not "otherwise
qualify" for the treatment.
Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1493 (10th Cir. 1992).
[VOL. 57:505
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fully distinguish between the kinds of cases in which the ADA will re-
quire treatment and those in which it will not. Because many futility
decisions involve individuals who have disabilities, 29 one's pointing
out, for example, that an infant without disabilities would not need
ventilator support would simply provide no guidance for deciding
which treatments would be futile in a whole category of cases.3 °
Consider an AIDS patient who accidentally injures her foot.
Here, the injury has nothing to do with the illness, and a refusal to
treat the foot injury would be, all else being equal, a violation of the
ADA, because the injury would certainly be treated if the person did
not have AIDS.3 1 It would at best be unhelpful to reject the Baby K
district court's analysis by claiming that the person without AIDS
would not have injured her foot, even if one can put aside the fact
that there is no reason to believe that only AIDS patients injure their
feet. By the same token, even if one puts aside the fact that
nonanencephalic infants may also require respiratory support (e.g.,
infants born prematurely) ,32 one will not establish the weakness of the
Baby K interpretation by simply denying that nondisabled infants will
need ventilator treatment.
The point here is not that the AIDS patient with the foot injury
and the anencephalic child in need of respiratory treatment are
analogous in all respects. In the former case, the foot injury would be
unrelated to the disability, 3 whereas in the latter case, the ventilator
treatment would be needed precisely because of the disability. 34 In-
29. See Mary A. Crossley, Medical Futility and Disability Discimination, 81 IoWA L. REv.
179, 213 (1995) ('[lIt is quite difficult to imagine (or find in the medical literature) an
example of a person for whom life-sustaining medical treatment would be deemed futile
who would not also be 'an individual with a disability.'").
30. A further difficulty is that such a point may be inaccurate. See infra note 32 and
accompanying text (suggesting that premature infants may also need respiratory support).
31. See Scofield, supra note 27, at 943 (contrasting "treating a person with AIDS for a
foot injury" with a treatment decision "necessitated by virtue of the patient's disability").
32. See Nancy K. Rhoden, Treatment Dilemmas for Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality of Life
Counts, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1283, 1293 (1985) (discussing how premature infants frequently
require respiratory support).
33. See id. at 1299 (arguing that the nondiscrimination principle functions properly in
Down's syndrome cases in part because "the life-threatening condition is separate from,
and unrelated to, the handicap"); Jennifer Stokley, Note, Withdrawing or Withholding Medi-
cal Care from Premature Infants: Who Should Decide, and How?, 70 N.D. L. REv. 129, 138
(1994) (describing nondiscrimination as working well in the rare cases in which the handi-
cap is unrelated to the life-threatening condition).
34. See Larson, supra note 14, at 1453 ("Baby K's anencephaly did cause her respiratory
distress.").
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deed, this distinction does not seem to have been appreciated by the
Baby K district court.3 5
The Baby K district court suggested that Baby K's breathing diffi-
culties had to be distinguished from her anencephaly.36 While that is
true at least in the sense that an anencephalic infant will not always
have occurrent respiratory difficulties,37 the district court was wrong,
at least in part, to imply that Baby K's respiratory difficulties would be
analogous to the difficulties faced by an accident victim who had can-
cer or AIDS.3" This is because the difficulties of the latter patients
would not be caused by or associated with their illnesses, while the
same could not be said of Baby K" Commentators have suggested
that it may be legally significant if the condition for which treatment is
sought is unrelated to the underlying illness.4 °
Yet, this point is less telling than it might first appear. Even if the
condition is not associated with the underlying disability, this does not
imply that the condition should therefore be treated.41 If futility is to
have any substantive content at all, it cannot be true that conditions
not associated with the underlying disability must be treated regardless
of the patient's prognosis. Further, the mere fact that Baby K had
35. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1027 (E.D. Va. 1993) (drawing an analogy
between the respiratory difficulties of anencephalic infants and the respiratory difficulties
of accident victims who have terminal cancer or AIDS), aff'd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994).
36. Id. ("[R]espiratory difficulty... is the emergency medical condition that must be
treated under EMTALA.").
37. See Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596 (explaining that Baby K can go months at a time without
requiring respiratory support).
38. See Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1027 (stating that denying Baby K treatment would
enable hospitals to refuse emergency treatment to patients who have AIDS or cancer be-
cause "they eventually will die anyway from those diseases").
39. See Larson, supra note 14, at 1453 ("The cancer or AIDS did not cause the acciden-
tal injury, whereas Baby K's anencephaly did cause her respiratory distress.").
40. One commentator has noted:
[I]f a blind person is denied a kidney transplant on account of her congenital
blindness, there might be unlawful discrimination, since the need for a kidney
transplant is independent of the blindness. However, if a child with a severe de-
velopmental disability is denied a surgical procedure to treat the disability, there
would be no unlawful discrimination because the need for the surgical procedure
arises out of the disability itself.
David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Discrimination
Against the Sick, 31 HAtRv. C.R.-C.L. L. REy. 49, 60-61 (1996); accord Mary Crossley, Infants
with Anencephaly, the ADA, and the Child Abuse Amendments, 11 ISSUEs L. & MED. 379, 401
(1996) (describing courts that have "suggested that disability discrimination law applies to
medical decisions only if the condition requiring treatment is unrelated to the person's
disability").
41. See Rhoden, supra note 32, at 1301-02 (suggesting that it may be inappropriate to
treat an unrelated condition in a case involving someone who will never regain conscious-
ness in any event).
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difficulties associated with her disability would not, of itself, necessar-
ily absolve the hospital of any duty to treat the infant. Just as an AIDS
patient who has an illness associated with the disease (e.g., pneumo-
cystis carinii pneumonia)42 would not be barred from receiving treat-
ment,43 so too Baby K, who had difficulties associated with her
condition, should not be barred from receiving treatment simply by
virtue of the nexus between her difficulties and her condition. If
treating Baby K was futile, it was not merely because the condition
requiring treatment was associated with her underlying disability, nor
even merely because Baby K's long-term prognosis was not as good as
that of a nonanencephalic infant in need of respiratory therapy. The
ADA does not require that the prognosis for an individual with a disa-
bility be as good as that of a similarly situated person without the disa-
bility in order for the person with a disability to fall within the Act's
protection. 4
The question at hand is not whether there should be a bar to
treatment whenever the difficulties are associated with an illness.
Rather, the question is when, if ever, would difficulties be futile to
treat, regardless of whether they are associated with a particular ill-
ness. It seems clear that the definition of futility should rely on some
basis other than simply whether the conditions are illness-related;
otherwise, someone with a good prognosis might not receive treat-
ment because her condition was associated with her illness, whereas
someone with a very bad prognosis might nonetheless receive treat-
ment because the condition was not associated with her illness.
Commentators point out a relevant difference between Baby K
and an accident victim with a terminal illness: The accident victim
who receives treatment may be restored to a functioning-albeit
shortened-life, whereas Baby K could not be so restored.45 The
42. See Keith Shiner, Note, Medical Futility: A Futile Concept, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 803,
825 (1996) (describing pneumocystis carinii pneumonia as "a leading complication caused
by AIDS").
43. See id. (explaining how Baby Rena, after being diagnosed with pneumocystis carinii
pneumonia, was placed on a respirator and received artificial feeding and medication).
44. But see Kristi E. Schrode, Comment, Life in Limbo: Revising Policies for Permanently
Unconscious Patients, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1609, 1658 (1995) (implying that treatment may be
withheld if it would be less effective for that patient than for others).
45. According to one commentator, the relevant difference is this:
An AIDS patient may tragically have a shorter than expected life span, but it is
generally a fully conscious life. Further, there remains hope that a treatment of a
suppressed immune system is possible. In contrast, Baby K was not able to hear,
see, think, or interact with others. There is no cure that could have replaced her
missing brain to provide a chance of any sort of conscious life.
Mark A. Bonanno, The Case of Baby K: Exploring the Concept of Medical Futility, 4 ANNALis
HEALTH L. 151, 167-68 (1995) (footnote omitted).
1998] 513
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question at hand is whether Baby K's inability to function in particular
ways or at a particular level46 would render her treatment medically
futile. A separate question, though not the focus of this Article, is
whether federal law would permit the nontreatment of Baby K, even if
it were medically futile.
47
II. DEFINING MEDICAL FUTILITY
There is no consensus about how to define futile medical care.4"
Numerous definitions have been offered, none of which is satisfactory.
Some definitions seem clearly underinclusive, others seem clearly
overinclusive, while still others seem both overinclusive and underin-
clusive. An appropriate definition of futility neither negates the term
by preventing it from doing any work nor unduly expands the term by
calling treatments futile that nonetheless could afford the patient ad-
ditional conscious life.
A. Futility as Treatment's Having No Effect
Some define futility in terms of the treatment producing no ef-
fect.4 9 If a patient has a virus, for example, it will be futile to use
antibiotics to treat that virus, because antibiotics do not affect vi-
46. Morreim, supra note 25, at 901 ("It is meaningless to speak of [Baby K's] 'opportu-
nities' or of her 'participation' in society.").
47. See In reBaby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1027 (E.D. Va. 1993) (suggesting that EMTALA
does not have an exception for futile treatments), affd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); id. at
1029 (suggesting that the ADA does not have a futility exception); see also Smith, supra note
16, at 1532 (suggesting that the ADA would protect anencephalic infants like Baby K). But
see Beth Brandon, Note, Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors: A Question of Life or Death, 40
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 781, 811-12 (1989-1990) (suggesting that the federal Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 51 0 6g(6 ) (West Supp. 1997), as amended,
would allow withholding treatment from anencephalic infants).
48. See Bonanno, supra note 45, at 157 ("In general, the concept of medical futility is
poorly defined and frequently misused in the clinical setting."); Council on Ethical & Judi-
cial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Guidelines for the Appropriate Use of Do-Not-Resuscitate Or-
ders, 265JAMA 1868, 1870 (1991) ("Evidence suggests that terms such as futility, when used
by physicians to express the probability of achieving a specified outcome, have a variety of
potential meanings that are understood differently by different physicians."); Crossley,
supra note 29, at 187 (discussing "the absence of consensus on how to define the term
'futility'"); Judith F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physician's Professional
Conscience, 44 HASTINGs L.J. 1241, 1246 (1993) ("[T]here is a general lack of consensus in
defining what constitutes medically futile treatment.").
49. See Eric M. Levine, A New Predicament for Physicians: The Concept of Medical Futility, the
Physician's Obligation to Render Inappropriate Treatment, and the Interplay of the Medical Standard
of Care, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 69, 74 (1994-1995) (discussing situations where treatment pro-
duces virtually no effect).
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ruses.50 This criterion of futility seems relatively straightforward-as
long as the treatment produces no effect, it cannot be claimed to be
an appropriate treatment.5 1 Yet, even if it is obvious that treatments
that produce no effect should be considered futile, that does not es-
tablish that only such treatments should be considered futile. Other-
wise, "futility" would imply that treatments that produce any effect
would not appropriately be so classified.5 2 For example, treating pa-
tients in a permanent vegetative state would then not be futile. 53 Fur-
ther, treating a cut on the arm of someone who is dying might not be
futile, because one would thereby be killing bacteria capable of caus-
ing an infection, even if the killing of those bacteria would have no
effect on the patient's prognosis.5 4 Indeed, consider a treatment that
does not extend the patient's life and does not benefit her in any way,
but only diminishes her quality of life by causing her additional
50. See id. ("Antibiotics, which combat bacterial infections, are ineffective in fighting
viral infections."). Along this same line of reasoning, commentators have explained:
No physician would feel obligated to yield to a patient's demand to treat pneumo-
nia with insulin. The physician would rightly argue that (in the absence of insu-
lin-requiring diabetes) such treatment is inappropriate; insulin might have a
physiologic effect on the patient's blood sugar, but would offer no benefit to the
patient with respect to the pneumonia.
Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112
ANNALS INTERNA.L MED. 949, 950 (1990); accord Marc D. Stem, "And You Shall Choose Life":
Futility and the Religious Duty to Preserve Life, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 997, 998 (1995) (discuss-
ing "treatments which have no effect whatsoever, such as laetrile as a cancer cure").
51. See Robert M. Veatch & Carol Mason Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The Role of the
Physician in Setting Limits, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 15 (1992) (suggesting that "care that
produces no demonstrable effect" is clearly futile medical care).
52. One commentator writes:
By direct implication of mandating endless respirator care for anencephalic, ter-
minally ill Baby K, we have embraced the farthest reaches of what I will call "exoti-
care": virtually any cost for virtually any level of care must be shouldered for
virtually any patient who has even the smallest chance of surviving or benefitting,
even for a short time.
Morreim, supra note 25, at 910.
53. See Marcia Angell, Editorial, The Case of Helga Wanglie: A New Kind of "Right to Die"
Case, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 511, 512 (1991) ("In the family's view, however, merely main-
taining [the] life [of someone who would never be restored to consciousness] was a worthy
goal, and the respirator was not only effective toward that end, but essential."); George P.
Smith, II, Utility and the Principle of Medical Futility: Safeguarding Autonomy and the Prohibition
Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 7 (1995)
("[T]his definition is too narrow to permit withholding or withdrawing treatment from a
body doomed to existence in a [persistent vegetative state]."). But see Conservatorship of
Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 856 (Ct. App. 1988) (suggesting that the focal point for some-
one in a permanent vegetative state should be whether the person could be returned to
consciousness, rather than whether the biological vegetative existence could be
continued).
54. Cf Rhoden, supra note 32, at 1315 (discussing how treating an infection of a per-
manently unconscious infant might be required).
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pain.5 5 Such a treatment would not seem to be futile on the futility-as-
having-no-effect view.56 While treatments that produce no effect are
clearly futile, a definition that restricts the concept to this sole crite-
rion is clearly underinclusive.
B. Futility as Treatment That Is Not Beneficial
A treatment whose only effect is to increase pain would seem to
be a paradigmatic example of futile treatment.57 Rather than defin-
ing futility in terms of treatments that have no effect, it seems more
accurate and complete to define the concept in terms of treatments
that have no beneficial effect.5" Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court has suggested that a treatment is ineffective unless it affords
some benefit to the patient.59
It is not clear, however, that defining futility in terms of a treat-
ment's having no beneficial effect, rather than no effect at all, will
solve the difficulty suggested above. While the treatment that does
not extend life but only produces pain might then be classified as fu-
tile,6" the other two examples might still be viewed as beneficial; after
all, one could argue that it is beneficial both to prevent infections and
to keep someone alive who is in a permanent vegetative state. 6 In-
deed, one might further argue that for a person in a persistent vegeta-
55. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J. 1985) (discussing a situation in which
"the patient is suffering, and will continue to suffer throughout the expected duration of
his life, unavoidable pain"); In re Richardson, 581 N.Y.S.2d 708, 709 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (dis-
cussing a case in which cardiopulmonary resuscitation would only "result in further unnec-
essary suffering"); Shiner, supra note 42, at 824 (discussing a case in which "intervention
would only inflict pain on the child without improving the possible outcome").
56. The claim here is not that such a treatment would be appropriate, but merely that
such a treatment would not be futile if futility is defined in terms of producing no effects.
57. But see Stem, supra note 50, at 1008 (suggesting that patients should be allowed to
"choose to endure possibly painful, futile treatments").
58. SeeJudith F. Daar, Medical Futility and Implications for Physician Autonomy, 21 Am. J.L.
& MED. 221, 221 (1995) (suggesting that medical futility implies that the "treatment will
provide no medical benefit to the patient"); Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Nancy Jecker,
Futility in Practice, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 437, 437 (1993) (arguing that a treatment
that fails to provide a benefit is futile); Shiner, supra note 42, at 827 (describing, among
other things, a conception of futility that includes "care that produces an effect, but offers
no benefit"). But see Veatch & Spicer, supra note 51, at 36 (suggesting that definitions of
futility are problematic insofar as they include "care that has an effect, but that clinicians
believe has no benefit").
59. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979) ("In the treatment of any
illness, terminal or otherwise, a drug is effective if it fulfills, by objective indices, its spon-
sor's claims of prolonged life, improved physical condition, or reduced pain.").
60. But see infra text following note 71.
61. By the same token, extending the life of an anencephalic infant might be viewed as
beneficial. See Morreim, supra note 25, at 888 ("Baby K's intermittent respirator treatments
do, after all, keep her alive when she would otherwise have died.").
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tive state, none of a whole host of treatments would be futile if the
person's life might thereby be prolonged.6 2 Also, doing everything to
keep a terminally ill person alive for as long as possible need not be
viewed as futile, regardless of the patient's condition, as long as there
is reason to believe that the terminally ill person's life might in fact be
extended.6 3 Further, consider a treatment that would in fact extend a
life, but the only "benefit" of that extension would be that the patient
would suffer.6 4 Some would argue that such a treatment would not be
futile because it would in fact extend life, although others would find
it difficult to characterize such a treatment as anything but futile.6 5
Analyses of futility are not limited to examinations of effects or
benefits, however. Indeed, some commentators offer a more refined
approach, in which futility is defined in terms of whether a treatment
will provide a net benefit. Under this definition, even if the extension
of life is viewed as a benefit, that benefit need not establish the nonfu-
tility of the treatment if, for example, the only effect of that extension
of life would be increased suffering for the patient.
66
When one talks about a net benefit, one is assigning relative val-
ues and weights to particular outcomes and suggesting that one out-
come is beneficial to some roughly quantifiable extent and that
another outcome is harmful to some roughly quantifiable extent.
Such an analysis requires that some system of values be used to deter-
62. Again, this reasoning would also seem applicable to anencephaly. See id. at 909
("Baby K, for example, received a respirator for respiratory distress. If her heart had failed,
however, she might have needed a left ventricular assist device or even an organ transplant.
They, too, could stave off her death a while longer." (footnote omitted)). But see Robert J.
Dzielak, Note, Physicians Lose the Tug of War to Pull the Plug. The Debate About Continued Futile
Medical Care, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 733, 764 (1995) ("Treatment that cannot alter the
irreversible nature of permanent unconsciousness or dependence on intensive medical
care consequently cannot improve a patient's quality of life and therefore is futile.").
63. Regarding the Baby K ruling in particular, it has been observed:
After the Baby K ruling, physician decisions regarding terminally ill newborns
may be controlled by the irrational beliefs of surrogates. Even if a patient is ter-
minally ill, all care necessary to keep the patient alive may be demanded and must
be provided, though it may be against the physician's best judgment.
Myerberg, supra note 19, at 400.
64. See Custody of a Minor, 434 N.E.2d 601, 609 (Mass. 1982) (describing a case in
which treatment "would involve a substantial degree of bodily invasion, accompanied by
discomfort and pain, and would do nothing but prolong the child's 'agony and suffer-
ing'"); Shiner, supra note 42, at 824 (describing a case in which "intervention would only
inflict pain on the child without improving the possible outcome").
65. See Stern, supra note 50, at 1008 (discussing individuals who would "choose to en-
dure possibly painful, futile treatments" and some commentators' reactions to such
decisions).
66. See, e.g., Veatch & Spicer, supra note 51, at 18 ("In order to establish that care is
futile, the clinician must claim that even though the care predictably will have some effect
that changes the way that the patient dies, the effect is not beneficial on balance.").
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mine whether and to what degree a particular outcome is beneficial.
Some commentators suggest that using net benefit as a measure of
futility inevitably involves potential conflicts of value and thus cannot
appropriately be used as a measure of medical futility.67
This argument is more easily understood if one considers the
context in which a dispute about medical futility might arise. If the
patient has clearly indicated that she does not want a particular treat-
ment, then she will not receive it whether or not the doctor believes it
to be futile.68 A judgment that a treatment is medically futile is only
important in those cases in which the patient (or surrogate) either
wants the treatment or has not expressed a view about the treatment.
In such cases, the issue will then be whether the treatment may per-
missibly be withheld without the patient's permission. 69
Commentators who criticize the net-benefit definition claim that
if there is a dispute about whether a treatment will provide a net bene-
fit (i.e., the doctor and the patient disagree about how to weigh the
costs and benefits of different possible outcomes), the issue is then
not one of medical futility but instead of what to do when doctor and
patient disagree about the relative worths of particular options.70
They argue that in such cases either a hybrid approach should be used
or the patient's values should triumph.7 '
Yet, this argument proves too much. Not only do analyses of net
benefit invariably involve claims and potential conflicts about the val-
ues to be assigned to different outcomes, but even analyses of whether
a treatment has any benefit at all invariably involve at least potential
conflicts about value. If a treatment has any effect at all, that effect
might be a benefit according to some value system. Thus, suppose
that one had a fatal illness, a symptom of which was diminished sensi-
67. See, e.g., id. at 15 ("It is ... when a patient or surrogate and the clinician disagree
over the benefit that the patient will receive from an intervention, that is most interesting
morally and that cannot properly be labelled medically futile." (emphasis omitted)).
68. Cf Mark Strasser, Assisted Suicide and the Competent Terminally Ill: On Ordinary Treat-
ments and Extraordinary Policies, 74 OR. L. REv. 539, 568-69 (1995) ("Patients clearly have the
right to reject their physicians', or even the reasonable person's analyses about what consti-
tutes the best course of treatment.").
69. See Steven Miles, Futility and Medical Professionalism, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 873, 873
(1995) (explaining that the medical-futility debate is "about the medical prerogative to
conclude that a treatment is so unlikely to be beneficial or its benefits are such a stark
departure from the normative ends of healing, palliating, or rehabilitating medicine that a
physician is not obliged to offer or prescribe the treatment").
70. SeeJohn D. Lantos et al., The Illusion of Futility in Clinical Practice, AM. J. MED., July
1989, at 81, 83 (discussing futility decisions when patients and doctors disagree about treat-
ment options).
71. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (discussing futility in terms of patient
goals); infra notes 135-141 and accompanying text (discussing a hybrid approach).
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tivity to pain. A treatment whose only effect was to increase the ability
to feel pain might be viewed as beneficial-perhaps as a way to help
one atone for one's sins-even if one was not able to understand or
appreciate that one's increased pain was serving that end. A treat-
ment whose only effect would be to extend one's nonconscious life
might also be viewed as beneficial-perhaps out of a belief in the in-
trinsic value of life-even if the benefitted patient could never know
that such a benefit had been conferred. If futility should not be de-
fined in terms of treatments that produce no net benefit, because such
a criterion involves a potentially irresolvable conflict of values, then
neither should futility be defined in terms of treatment that produces
no benefit at all, because, as with net-benefit analyses, those judg-
ments might involve irresolvable conflicts of value.72
Many deny that continuation of biological existence itself is nec-
essarily a benefit, although there is disagreement about why that is
SO. 73 Some courts have suggested that such prolongations are not
beneficial in those cases in which the patient will never have "a nor-
mal, functioning, integrated existence."74 Yet, even if treatment
which merely prolongs biological existence is futile, that will not be
simply because such a state does not involve a normal, functioning,
integrated existence. Indeed, using this criterion would raise a whole
host of difficulties, because, if for no other reason, it is by no means
clear how "normal functioning" should be defined. A criterion for
futility must be developed that neither requires normal functioning
nor limits medical futility to treatments that will have no effect
whatsoever.
The claim here is not that medical futility could not be defined in
terms of treatments that produce no effect, but that such a definition
is counterproductive and does not account for the common under-
standing of the term. If futility is defined in terms of the inability of a
treatment to produce any effect, then the only treatments that will be
72. But see supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (suggesting that the no-effect crite-
rion is underinclusive).
73. See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text (discussing different reasons why
treatments may be futile if they prolong the lives of persons who have experienced upper-
brain deaths).
74. In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134, 138 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); accord Cruzan by
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 345-46 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) ("Life, particularly human life, is not commonly thought of as a merely physiological
condition or function."); In re Cicero, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965, 967 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (distinguish-
ing the case before it from one in which "the court is asked to preserve an existence which
cannot be a life").
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precluded on futility grounds would be those that arguably should not
even have been "treatment candidates" in the first place.
In United States v. Rutherford,75 the Supreme Court suggested that
a drug is effective if it produces "prolonged life, improved physical
condition, or reduced pain."76 If futility is to be defined in terms of a
treatment producing no effect, however, the minimal standards sug-
gested by Rutherford for the efficacy of the treatment would still be too
robust to adopt. Indeed, on the no-effect view, a treatment that would
aggravate the condition would not be futile, because it would have an
effect on the patient.
77
Presumably, very few-if any-commentators would be tempted
to say that a treatment whose only effect is to produce pain would be
nonfutile. 71 Yet, the difficulty posed by deciding whether medical fu-
tility should be defined in terms of a treatment producing no benefit
or no net benefit has induced commentators to consider other op-
tions, one of which involves incorporating the patient's own goals into
an analysis of what the concept of futility means.
C. Patient Goals
Some commentators suggest that futility should be defined in
terms of the efficacy of a treatment in meeting the patient's goals.79 At
first glance, this proposal seems plausible: If the only effect a treat-
ment will have is to promote the biological existence of the patient,
and the patient does not want merely to have her biological existence
extended, then providing that treatment would be futile.
Commentators view the futility-as-nonproduction-of-patient's-
goals definition as rather narrow, and they imply that the only ques-
75. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
76. Id. at 555.
77. This is to be distinguished from assistance-in-dying, which is not viewed as "treat-
ing" a disease but, instead, as a separate issue that implicates autonomy and privacy consid-
erations. See Strasser, supra note 68, at 539 (discussing constitutional aspects of assisted
suicide).
78. But see Stem, supra note 50, at 1008 (suggesting that patients should be allowed to
"choose to endure possibly painful, futile treatments").
79. See, e.g., Daar, supra note 48, at 1255 ("[Mledical futility may be better defined by
discerning the likelihood that a particular treatment will produce the benefit sought by the
patient. If treatment will not produce a benefit sought by the patient, it can be considered
futile."); Veatch & Spicer, supra note 51, at 35 ("[P] hysicians have an expertise in deciding
whether an intervention will have an effect. They should be permitted to refuse to provide
a service that they can claim, based on reasonable medical knowledge, will not have the
effect that the patient desires.").
520 [VOL. 57:505
MEDICAL FUTILITY
tion is whether futility should be defined more broadly."s Yet, com-
mentators' claims notwithstanding, such a criterion is both too narrow
and too broad. Suppose, for example, that a particular treatment will
not cure the patient as quickly as she would like, although she under-
stands that it will indeed effect a cure. The treatment would be futile,
because it could not achieve her goals. Yet, it hardly seems appropri-
ate to call a treatment futile when that treatment would in fact cure
the person and return her to "normal functioning,"" l even if it works
less quickly than she would like.
Part of the robustness of the notion of patient autonomy involves
the patient's right to reject nondesired effective treatment.8 2 Indeed, if
a patient does not believe that life would be worth living even with
certain medical benefits, that patient has the right to refuse any treat-
ment that would provide those benefits, even if those benefits were
the results of the most medically beneficial treatment available to the
patient.8 3 However, equating futile treatment with treatment that
does not promote the patient's goals is counterproductive for at least
two different reasons: (1) it would have the counterintuitive result
that the most beneficial treatment could, conceivably, be termed med-
ically futile; and (2) it would render the concept of medical futility
virtually meaningless, because the only time that it would preclude a
treatment that would not be precluded by a patient's exercise of au-
80. See, e.g., Dale L. Moore, Challenging Parental Decisions to Overtreat Children, 5 HEALTH
MATux 311, 315 (1995) ("Certainly a treatment that will not work, because it 'will not
produce the effect being envisioned,' is futile by even the most restrictive definition."
(footnote omitted)).
81. But see StuartJ. Youngner, Who Defines Futility?, 260JAMA 2094, 2094 (1988) ("An
intervention that kept a patient alive for six months might well be judged futile because it
did not achieve an important goal of the patient-[e.g.], being able to walk and take care
of his or her own personal hygiene.").
A separate question is whether a competent adult should be allowed to refuse that
treatment and instead opt for a different treatment that would provide a quicker cure with
more severe side effects. Reliance on patient autonomy would not, of itself, lead one to
conclude that the rejected treatment would therefore be futile.
82. See Strasser, supra note 68, at 568 ("Where a clear conflict arises between a person's
informed, autonomous decision and the 'best' result for that person, the former must be
respected.").
83. See Bouvia v. Superior Court (Glenchur), 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that a patient has a right to refuse treatment, even when that treatment might
prolong her life); Strasser, supra note 68, at 568-69 ("Patients clearly have the right to reject
their physicians', or even the reasonable person's analyses about what constitutes the best
course of treatment.").
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tonomy would be when the treatment was desired by the patient, even
though the treatment would not promote the patient's goals.84
Presumably, there would be relatively few cases in which a patient
would want a treatment even though it would not promote her goals.
Indeed, if a patient were to insist upon receiving a particular treat-
ment, even after having been informed that it would not promote her
stated goals, one might infer that the patient had other unstated goals
that she believed would be promoted by receiving the treatment.
Thus, the not-meeting-the-patient's-goals notion of futility would seem
to do very little work indeed, because very few-if any-of the treat-
ments that would be rejected on futility grounds would not also be
rejected on autonomy grounds.
Suppose that treatment A would promote a patient's goals, albeit
to a lesser extent than would alternative treatment B. It would be un-
clear how to classify treatment A. Arguably, it should be considered
futile, because it does not meet the patient's goals in the most effec-
tive way possible, especially if efficacy is itself a goal of the patient; yet,
on the other hand, treatment A should not be considered futile, be-
cause it would promote the patient's goals to some extent, even if not
as effectively as treatment B would.
A different and more subtle concern involves the misunderstand-
ings that might result from linking futility to patients' desires and
goals. Suppose that medical futility is definitionally linked to those
treatments a patient might refuse. Suppose further that medical futil-
ity is also definitionally linked to those treatments that have proven
ineffective. It is foreseeable that individuals might misconstrue the
relevant definitions and decide that patients only have a right to re-
fuse futile, that is, ineffective treatments. Even were this confusion
not to be manifested in court decisions but, instead, "merely" in actual
medical cases not challenged in court, patients might still be forced to
undergo unwanted treatment and needless suffering because of such
a misunderstanding.
A separate point involves what patients do when they seek advice
from their doctors. A patient's decision about whether to have a given
treatment might itself depend upon whether the doctor believes that
the treatment is futile. When asking the doctor whether a treatment
would be futile, the patient might not merely be asking whether the
treatment would in fact help the patient attain her goals, but instead,
84. See Daar, supra note 48, at 1257 ("[T]he AMA concludes that treatment would be
considered futile if it could not be expected to achieve the goals expressed by the in-
formed patient, and therefore could be withheld even if requested by the patient.").
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the patient might also be asking about the likely benefits and costs of
the treatment.
A doctor who is asked whether a particular treatment is futile
might refuse to make such ajudgment until the patient has engaged in
extensive value and goal clarification, because the doctor could then
make a more accurate judgment about whether, in fact, the treatment
would promote the patient's goals.8 5 Yet, it would be both surprising
and counterproductive to require such a clarification before a futility
judgment could be made, because the patient (or surrogate) might
not have the interest, time, energy, training, or ability to do the re-
quired analysis. Futility judgments are not simply reducible to analy-
ses of whether treatment will help the patient attain her actual or
presumed goals.
Defining futility in terms of patient goals gives rise to other
counterintuitive implications. Consider two patients with identical
prognoses and pain tolerances. On the patient-indexed notion of fu-
tility, a given treatment might be medically futile for one and not for
the other because of a difference in the two patients' values. While
the common understanding of futility can easily account for a treat-
ment being futile for one patient and not for another-because the
prognoses of the two patients differ-that understanding cannot as
readily account for the same treatment being futile for one patient
and not for another even though the patients have the same diseases
and prognoses.8 6
At least in part because of some of the counterintuitive implica-
tions of using a patient-indexed definition of futility, some people
seek a more objective definition of futility.87 One could say, for exam-
ple, that "'medically futile means that cardiac resuscitation would be
85. The American Medical Association's Council on Ethical andJudicial Affairs noted:
Patients, therefore, should be encouraged to discuss with their physicians the ex-
pected benefits and objectives of medical treatment and to engage in an ongoing
dialogue regarding the potential for achieving these goals. Once the objectives of
the patient have been clearly expressed, the physician can determine and convey
to the patient whether CPR or other medical treatments are likely to be effective
in helping to achieve those goals.
Council on Ethical &Judicial Affairs, supra note 48, at 1870.
86. But cf Kathleen M. Boozang, Death Wish: Resuscitating Self-Determination for the Criti-
cally 1l4 35 Aiuz. L. REv. 23, 63 (1993) ("Because the physician does not base the futility
determination exclusively on objective medical criteria, the law should enable the patient
to retain ultimate authority to decide whether futile treatment should be withheld or with-
drawn."); Philip J. Boyle, Religious Reasoning in Health Care Resource Management: The Case of
Baby K, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 949, 955 (1995) (rejecting the assumption that "medical
judgments are objective, value-free, and preferred over religious, value-laden reasons").
87. But see David M. Smolin, Praying for Baby Rena: Religious Liberty, Medical Futility, and
Miracles, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 960, 971 (1995) (stating that the broader "sense of medical
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unsuccessful in restoring cardiac and respiratory function or that the
patient will experience repeated arrests in a short period of time
before death occurs.' "88
Defining futility in terms of the success of cardiac resuscitation
might seem overly restrictive, both because it is limited to one particu-
lar kind of treatment, and because it would mean that an individual
who had been resuscitated only to be in a coma for the rest of her life
would not have received futile treatment."9 Of course, in the latter
example, it presumably would not have been clear that resuscitation
would only result in a lifelong coma. There might have been an
eighty-percent chance that the resuscitation would be successful in ex-
tending life and only a twenty-percent chance that a successful resusci-
tation would result in permanent coma. Resuscitation would have
been offered in the hope that the patient's conscious life might
thereby be extended. I
Whenever decisions are being made regarding the futility of a
particular procedure, the probabilities of particular outcomes must be
considered. °° Where there is no chance (a zero-percent probability)
that a particular treatment will effect a change, then of course the
treatment is futile.91 Suppose, however, that a particular treatment is
effective one percent of the time. This treatment is not futile in the
same sense that using antibiotics for a virus is futile,92 because there is
'futility' arguably implicates ethical and religious questions about both the purposes of
human life and about death and dying").
88. In re Finn, 625 N.Y.S.2d 809, 812 (Sup. Ct.) (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTn LAw
§ 2961(12) (McKinney 1993)), modified sub nom. Finn v. Leonard C., 634 N.Y.S.2d 262
(App. Div. 1995).
89. Cf GA. CODE ANN. § 31-39-2(4) (B) (1996) ("'Candidate for nonresuscitation'
means a patient who, based on a determination to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
by an attending physician with the concurrence of another physician: ... Is in a noncogni-
tive state with no reasonable possibility of regaining cognitive functions."); Morgan v. Olds,
417 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) ("Resuscitation was again successful and Mor-
gan survived; however, Morgan suffered brain damage due to a lack of oxygen to the brain
and lapsed into a coma from which he never awoke.").
90. See Smith, supra note 53, at 8-9 ("When the physician wishes to withhold treatment
on the grounds of futility because the treatment is unlikely to produce a desired benefit,
however, the physician must balance the .... statistical probabilities of success or harm
derived through experimentation and analysis of hospital data."); cf Veatch & Spicer, supra
note 51, at 18 ("[W]hen a medical scientist makes the apparently scientific claim that a
treatment will have no relevant effect, he or she is making a probabilistic prediction.").
91. See George J. Annas, The "Right to Die" in America: Sloganeering from Quinlan and
Cruzan to Quill and Kevorkian, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 875, 888 (1996) (discussing a case in which
the doctors wrote "a DNR order because they believed it was impossible to resuscitate [the
patient] anyway, i.e., it would be futile").
92. See Levine, supra note 49, at 79 ("Characterizing a treatment as 'useless' based on
the extremely low chance that a physiological effect will occur requires an opinion that this
low probability is not worth pursuing, not a scientific determination that the physiological
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some chance that the treatment will lead to a desirable outcome.
However, it is simply unclear whether a treatment that is effective one
percent or even five percent of the time should be considered futile.9"
There is some probability of success at or below which treatments
should be considered futile. Whether the appropriate threshold
should be set at one percent or ten percent is a matter of dispute.9 4 A
complicating factor is that one threshold might be set to determine
which treatments are medically futile and a different threshold might
be set to determine which nonfutile treatments are nonetheless suffi-
ciently unlikely to be successful to warrant not being offered.9 5 While
a treatment exceeding the former but not the latter threshold would
still not be offered, the reason that it would not be offered would not
involve futility but, for example, scarce resources.
9 6
The determination of the threshold probability of success below
which a treatment would be considered futile cannot be made without
at least implicitly considering which among a range of goals might
appropriately be considered relevant. This is because the probability
of reaching a relatively modest goal would usually be much higher
than the probability of reaching a very ambitious goal. As suggested
above, it would be inappropriate to use immediate cure as the goal
when determining whether a treatment is futile.9 7 Even if there is a
zero-percent probability that a particular treatment would effect a
cure immediately, that should not make the treatment futile.
effect sought is scientifically impossible."); see also supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text
(discussing the futility of, among other things, using antibiotics to treat a virus).
93. See Lantos et al., supra note 70, at 83 ("[T]he patient and the doctor must together
determine whether the probability of attaining desired goals is so low that therapy may be
deemed futile."); Erich H. Loewy & Richard A. Carlson, Futility and Its Wider Implications: A
Concept in Need of Further Examination, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 429, 430 (1993) ("But
what about something that has a 0.05% chance of success; what about 0.1%, 2%, or 5%?");
Nealy, supra note 22, at 138 ("Whether or not a one-percent chance of success or even a
five-percent chance of success is low enough to be characterized as futile treatment is
highly debatable.").
94. See Council on Ethical &Judicial Affairs, supra note 48, at 1870 ("[S]ome physicians
describe a medical treatment as futile only if the possibility of success approaches 0%,
whereas others associate futility with success rates as high as 13%.").
95. See infra notes 203-206 and accompanying text (distinguishing between futility and
rationing).
96. See infra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing how justifications for futility
and rationing differ).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 80-86 (implying that it would be inappropriate to
deem futile a treatment that would cure a patient, even though the treatment would not
effectuate a cure as quickly as the patient would like).
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D. Qualitative and Quantitative Judgments
When discussing the range of outcomes that might appropriately
be the basis of a judgment that a given treatment is futile, commenta-
tors distinguish between two types of judgments: qualitative and
quantitative judgments.98 A qualitative judgment involves an analysis
of the quality of life the individual may have if offered treatment.99 A
quantitative judgment, on the other hand, involves an analysis of the
likelihood that a treatment will achieve a particular result (e.g., how
often a treatment was effective in the last 100 cases in which it was
used for a particular condition, or how long the individual will live
even with treatment). 1°
1. Qualitative Judgments.--Some commentators suggest that futil-
ity judgments must involve an analysis of what the patient's life will be
like if she receives treatment.1° ' This analysis may involve focusing on
whether the patient is expected to be conscious or able to enjoy
life. 102 Other commentators focus on whether further treatment will
only produce increased suffering.1 °3 The important issue to be re-
solved is whether the attainable quality of life is itself worthy of
pursuit. 104
98. See Shiner, supra note 42, at 827 ("One can consider two broad conceptions of
futility: (1) care that produces no effect (physiological or quantitative futility), and (2)
care that produces an effect, but offers no benefit (qualitative futility).").
99. See Daar, supra note 48, at 1254 (defining qualitative futility as "focusing on the
nature of individual benefit").
100. Id. (defining quantitative futility as "focusing on the degree of overall success"); see
also Morreim, supra note 25, at 886 (discussing the argument that treating anencephalic
infants is futile because they will die soon no matter what is done); Schneiderman et al.,
supra note 50, at 951 (proposing that when physicians conclude "that in the last 100 cases,
a medical treatment has been useless, they should regard that treatment as futile"); cf.
Council on Ethical &Judicial Affairs, supra note 48, at 1870 ("The successful application of
CPR also has been gauged by criteria that relate to the length of patient survival. Such
criteria include, for example, survival for at least 24 hours following initial resuscitation,
survival until discharge from the hospital, and survival for some other time frame.").
101. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 32, at 1304 ("To adequately assess benefit, the nature
of the life being preserved cannot be ignored.").
102. See Morreim, supra note 25, at 886 (discussing the argument that treating
anencephalic infants "is futile because they will never be conscious or enjoy any form of
human experience"); Rhoden, supra note 32, at 1317 ("The permanently unconscious in-
fant is the clearest indication that 'vitalism,' the view that mere biological existence must
be preserved at all costs, is untenable, especially since modern technology can prolong life
indefinitely.").
103. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 32, at 1315 (suggesting that although treating an infec-
tion of a permanently unconscious infant is "virtually futile, such treatment itself is not
painful" and therefore should be required).
104. See Nancy S. Jecker & Robert A. Pearlman, Commentary, Medical Futility: Who De-
cides?, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1140, 1141 (1992) (discussing "the position that at
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The decision about whether a particular quality of life is worthy
of pursuit might be approached in several different ways. One might
make the decision in light of the patient's own values,10 5 which in turn
may implicate religious values. 106 This approach basically mirrors an
autonomy approach-the judgment would reflect what the patient
said or would have said had she been competent and able to manifest
her desires.'0
7
A different way to analyze the quality-of-life considerations would
be to examine the possible effects that the treatment will have on the
person's own life without considering how the patient would have valued
those effects.108 Suppose, for example, that a particular treatment could
at best prolong the patient's biological existence. The patient would
be unable to appreciate the continued life, because she would never
be restored to consciousness. This quality of life would seem suffi-
ciently low to justify classifying the treatment as futile, even if the patient
had previously expressed the desire to receive such treatment.10 9
Commentators sometimes suggest that qualitative futility judg-
ments involve whether the treatment will benefit the person,"' not
some point along a continuum the quality of life associated with an intervention becomes
so poor that the decision to withhold or withdraw treatment no longer rests with the pa-
tient (or surrogate) .... [but] becomes, instead, the physician's prerogative").
105. See In re Visbeck, 510 A.2d 125, 132 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986) ("Responsible
people who believe that quality of life factors should be considered .... are looking at the
matter from the viewpoint of the patient herself."); Developments in the Law--Medical Tech-
nology and the Law, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1519, 1652 (1990) [hereinafter Medical Technology and
the Law] ("Courts generally agree that if quality-of-life considerations have any influence at
all, the appropriate scope should be defined by the value to the patient.").
106. See Smolin, supra note 87, at 971 (discussing a "sense of medical 'futility' [that]
arguably implicates ethical and religious questions about both the purposes of human life
and about death and dying").
107. See generally Mark Strasser, Incompetents and the Right to Die: In Search of Consistent
Meaningful Standards, 83 Ky. L.J. 733 (1994-1995) (discussing autonomy issues in the light
of incompetent patients).
108. Cf Morreim, supra note 25, at 901 ("It is meaningless to speak of [Baby K's] 'oppor-
tunities' or of her 'participation' in society. Heroic medical care could extend her life, but
being alive made no further difference in her own life.").
109. See Crossley, supra note 29, at 188 (describing a procedure that, although prolong-
ing the patient's survival, "would not provide any benefits that she seems capable of
appreciating").
110. See id. (discussing the view that the relevant question is "whether a proposed treat-
ment offers any benefit to the patient as a whole person, not simply whether the treatment
will produce discrete physiological effects"); Jecker & Pearlman, supra note 104, at 1141
("[T]he house staff's judgment that treatment is futile may reflect their assessment that
nutrition and hydration produces a physiologic effect without conferring a medical benefit to
the patient."); cf. Annas, supra note 91, at 879 ("[Anencephalic infants] are in very bad
shape, and there is nothing we can do to benefit them. We certainly have no obligation to
treat them."); Dzielak, supra note 62, at 764 ("Treatment that cannot alter the irreversible
nature of permanent unconsciousness or dependence on intensive medical care conse-
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merely her organs," 1 and that "treatment that provides an effect to a
portion of the body without providing a benefit to the person as a
whole is futile." 112 They would suggest that extending the life of
someone in a permanent vegetative state might benefit the person's
kidneys, for example, but would not benefit the person herself.'13
The view that treatment is futile if it benefits organs but not per-
sons might be justified in a few different ways (e.g., by establishing
that there is a societal consensus to that effect)." 4 Of course, as a
general matter, societal consensus should not be the sole basis upon
which the definition of futility should be based. Appropriate safe-
guards would have to be in place to prevent a societal consensus from
establishing that an obviously nonfutile treatment was nonetheless fu-
tile;" 5 otherwise, individuals might be denied the protection that they
are due under the Constitution." 6 It would be important to make
sure that the societal consensus about futility did not involve an at-
tempt to discriminate invidiously against a disfavored group. 7
Two points should be made with respect to the potential invidi-
ousness of describing treatments as futile if they would merely pro-
long vegetative existence. First, in order to assert the futility of
quently cannot improve a patient's quality of life and therefore is futile."). But see Crossley,
supra note 29, at 224 (criticizing commentators who "suggest that life-sustaining nutritional
support is futile for persons in a persistent vegetative state, despite their potential to live
for many years if provided with medical support" (footnote omitted)).
111. See Rhoden, supra note 32, at 1317 ("[W]e seek benefits to persons, not to isolated
organs.").
112. Allen J. Bennett, When Is Medical Treatment "Futile"?, 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 35, 39
(1993) (describing the view that a "treatment that provides an effect to a portion of the
body without providing a benefit to the person as a whole is futile").
113. See Rhoden, supra note 32, at 1320 ("[D]ialysis would have 'benefitted' Karen Ann
Quinlan's kidneys but could not have helped Karen Ann.").
114. See Rebecca Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients, 46
RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 649 (1994) ("The quality-of-life judgment that unconscious life need
not be sustained is eminently defensible.... [Society] substantially supports this quality-of-
life judgment."); Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 105, at 1603 ("A morally legiti-
mate approach to neonatal intensive care decisionmaking must involve some quality-of-life
judgments. Such judgments must spring from a social consensus based on moral values
and medical knowledge.").
115. Cf infra notes 212-218 and accompanying text (discussing misperceptions of what it
is like to live with a disability).
116. Cf Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405-06 (1856) (denying citizen-
ship and various constitutional protections to African Americans).
117. In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), the Court refused to
characterize the mentally handicapped as a quasi-suspect class. Id. at 442-43. The Court,
however, may have been using a heightened rational-basis test to strike the zoning law at
issue. See Mark Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don't Ask; If It Is, Don't Tell: On Deference, Rational-
ity, and the Constitution, 66 U. COLO. L. R~v. 375, 430-31 (1995) (discussing the Cleburne
rational-basis test).
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treatment that merely prolongs permanent unconsciousness, one
need not contend that the permanently unconscious are nonpersons.
This is because the futility of such treatment would be due to the qual-
ity of life it would produce and not to the nonpersonhood of the po-
tential recipient. Arguably, this futility classification does not involve
an invidious distinction but rather a claim that the possible "benefit"
would not meet the qualitative threshold below which treatment
should be considered futile.
Second, suppose a claim were made that the permanently uncon-
scious were not persons in a constitutional sense and thus did not
have a right to treatment.118 Such a claim, even if accepted, would
have fewer legal implications than might originally be supposed; for
example, it would not imply that such individuals would be without
legal protection. Just as the state may have compelling interests in
protecting fetuses,119 even though they are not persons in a constitu-
tional sense, 12 the state would presumably have important if not com-
pelling interests in protecting the permanently unconscious, even if
they were not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, even if
the permanently unconscious were classified as nonpersons, this
would not imply, for example, that they could be used as a source for
organs against their previously expressed wishes or their family's
will.
12 1
2. Quantitative Judgments. -- Quantitative judgments involve anal-
yses of the likelihood that a particular goal will be achieved or that life
will in fact be extended.1 22 Some courts and commentators suggest
that quantitative futility is the only appropriate measure of futility, and
118. Sometimes, anencephalic infants are described as nonpersons lacking treatment
rights. See Jay A. Friedman, Taking the Camel by the Nose: The Anencephalic as a Source for
Pediatric Organ Transplants, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 957 (1990) ("Anencephalics, who lack
the capacity or potential for even the most minimal level of cogitation and social interac-
tion, clearly are [nonpersons]."); John A. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective
Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 213, 251 (1975) ("[T]he only group of defec-
tive newborns who would clearly qualify as nonpersons is anencephalics, who altogether
lack a brain.").
119. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (plurality opinion)
("[V]iability marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal life is constitution-
ally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.").
120. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) ("[T]he word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.").
121. Although other reasons might be proffered, some commentators suggest that be-
cause anencephalic infants are persons, their organs cannot be harvested. See, e.g., Annas,
supra note 91, at 879.
122. See Crossley, supra note 29, at 188 (discussing the view of certain theorists that
quantitative futility involves "the probability that any benefit will be achieved"); Morreim,
supra note 25, at 886 ("Quantitatively, [treatment] is futile because an anencephalic like
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that it is simply inappropriate to consider quality of life judgments in
this context.123 Yet, even if that were true, the relevant issues would
not thereby be settled, because the question might then be whether
the prolongation of vegetative existence really counts as an extension
of "life." Justice Stevens has suggested that for patients "who have no
consciousness and no chance of recovery, there is a serious question
as to whether the mere persistence of their bodies is 'life' as that word
is commonly understood, or as it is used in both the Constitution and
the Declaration of Independence.'
112 4
Even if one puts aside the concerns raised by Justice Stevens, and
even if one uses quantity of life as the relevant criterion, there will still
be the need to establish the relevant quantitative threshold (e.g.,
whether a few more minutes of life would suffice to make the treat-
ment nonfutile, or whether, instead, the treatment must yield weeks
or months of additional life). However, even a relatively robust quan-
titative futility standard-requiring, for example, treatment to extend
life for weeks-might not be sufficiently robust to exclude treatment
that most commentators would call futile: It has been reported that
"individuals" who are completely brain dead may, nonetheless, be
kept "alive" for weeks.125
For some patients, further medical treatment will be futile both
quantitatively and qualitatively, so it will not matter which criterion is
employed to establish futility. 126 However, unless some qualitative
measure of futility is used, others could be kept alive indefinitely
Baby K will die soon no matter what physicians do." (emphasis omitted)); Dzielak, supra
note 62, at 754 ("Under a quantitative analysis, treatment is not futile if it prolongs life.").
123. See, e.g., Cruzan by Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988) (en banc)
("The state's concern with the sanctity of life rests on the principle that life is precious and
worthy of preservation without regard to its quality."), affd sub nom. Cruzan by Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); see also supra notes 58-65 and accompa-
nying text (discussing what treatment outcomes constitute benefits). However, some
courts disagree:
If we require treatment decisions to be made without any reference to quality of
life factors, we will be creating other kinds of risks of bad decision making. Worse
than that, we will be guaranteeing that bad decisions will be made and that large
numbers of people will be thoughtlessly and automatically compelled to continue
lives of intolerable bleakness.
In re Visbeck, 510 A.2d 125, 133 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986).
124. Cruzan by Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 345 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf. Edward R. Grant,
Medical Futility: Legal and Ethical Aspects, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 330, 331 (1992)
("There is another risk, not so frequently identified, that the language of futility could be
misconstrued to imply that it is the futility (or utility) of the patient's life that is under
consideration.").
125. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Morreim, supra note 25, at 886 (suggesting that treating anencephalic in-
fants is futile both quantitatively and qualitatively).
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(without their ever gaining consciousness), despite the absence of any
brain functioning at all.' 27 In part because some of these life exten-
sions seem futile even if desired, some commentators offer definitions
of futility that include both qualitative and quantitative compo-
nents. 128 For example, some suggest that a futility determination
should involve whether the individual will be able to leave the hospi-
tal. 1 29 This test involves both quantitative and qualitative elements,
because the individual would not only have to survive for a certain
period of time, but she would also have to have a quality of life that
would allow her to live outside the hospital setting.
For a certain class of patients, it is unlikely that treatment
would ever allow them to live outside of the hospital.' A separate
question would be whether treating them would therefore be futile. 1 '
Even if there is little hope that a patient will be able to leave the hospi-
tal after receiving treatment,132 there may be some hope that life
could be extended for several days, thereby allowing the patient to say
127. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 29, at 188 (discussing a definition of futility that "in-
volves both qualitative and quantitative components").
129. See id. at 188-89 (discussing the viewpoint that "if studies reveal that, among pa-
tients with metastatic cancer, none has survived to hospital discharge after receiving CPR,
then resuscitating patients with metastatic cancer should be considered futile").
130. See Paul C. Sorum, Limiting Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 57 ALB. L. REV. 617, 621
(1994) (discussing a kind of "patient whose serious underlying disease puts him or her in a
category in which survival after an arrest and resuscitation until discharge from the hospi-
tal would be unprecedented, or, as others would insist, a category in which survival is rare if
not actually unprecedented" (footnote omitted)).
131. See id. at 622 (suggesting that it is "illegitimate for a physician to deny the option of
CPR to his or her patient on the grounds that the patient is going to die soon anyway").
132. But see id. ("[W]hen a variety of studies of the outcomes of CPR are examined, no
category of patients is without some survivors to discharge. It would be very difficult, if not
impossible, therefore, to draw the line between those for whom CPR is futile and those for
whom it is not." (footnote omitted)).
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good-bye to loved ones.'3 3  It simply is impossible to determine
whether such additional time would not be worth living.13 4
E. Hybrid Futility Judgments
Some commentators suggest that futility judgments should be
based upon a hybrid approach incorporating both physician and pa-
tient perspectives.1 3 5 Under this approach, medical personnel would
not undervalue the benefits that might be accrued by treatment and
conclude that a particular treatment would be futile when the patient
would have concluded otherwise.1
3 6
Consider the claim that treatment is futile because it will not al-
low the patient to leave the hospital.'3 7 Arguably, this example illus-
trates the weakness of defining futility objectively: For some patients,
such a treatment would be futile, but for those patients who want to
see a relative one last time, it would not be futile. 138 Yet, appearances
133. One commentator explains:
Many of the studies to which Murphy refers measure futility of CPR by whether or
not the resuscitated patients lived to leave the hospital. Using this standard, CPR
was futile if the patient lived a week, but died before discharge.... Living for five
more days might give some patients the opportunity to say good-byes, to wait for
the arrival of a loved one from another city, or to live to see the birth of a
grandchild.
Youngner, supra note 81, at 2094-95 (commenting on DonaldJ. Murphy, Do-Not-Resuscitate
Orders: Time for Reappraisal in Long-term-Care Institutions, 260 JAMA 2098 (1988)); accord
Levine, supra note 49, at 78 ("While postponing death for one week may seem worthless to
some, others may find it a noble cause. For example, consider the elderly patient nearing
death who wants to see the grandchild she was never able to meet." (footnote omitted));
Nealy, supra note 22, at 138 ("Even when a course of treatment is deemed futile, living for
five more days might give some patients the opportunity to say good-byes, to wait for a
loved one to arrive from another city, or simply to come to terms with the grief of losing a
loved one.").
134. Cf Sorum, supra note 130, at 623 ("[P]atients frequently adjust to and find some
benefit in even painful and restricted modes of existence.").
135. Cf Daar, supra note 48, at 1254 ("Any single definition of medical futility, be it
qualitative (focusing on the nature of individual benefit) or quantitative (focusing on the
degree of overall success), can be criticized for failing to include some component of indi-
vidual patient goals."); Lantos et al., supra note 70, at 84 ("Futility determinations, like all
treatment choices, must include both clinical judgments about the chance of success of a
therapy and an explicit consideration of the patient's goals for therapy."); Levine, supra
note 49, at 82 ("Based on this contemporary notion of shared decisionmaking, both the
physician's recommendations and the patient's ultimate decision on a proposed course of
treatment are essential to any medical decision.").
136. See infra notes 212-218 and accompanying text (discussing whether individual doc-
tors or society as a whole should define what constitutes futile treatment).
137. Cf Sorum, supra note 130, at 622 ("The real debate about futility thus narrows
down to whether CPR can be deemed futile... where survival to hospital discharge would
be unprecedented or at least rare, as in fact the American Heart Association and the other
major proponents of the futility argument have claimed." (footnote omitted)).
138. One commentator notes:
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to the contrary notwithstanding, this example fails to establish that
futility should not be defined objectively; rather, this example suggests
that there is a danger of conflating two different issues: (1) whether
the objective standard has been set at the appropriate level, and (2)
whether futility must involve both objective and subjective standards.
Merely because a patient does not want to receive treatment does
not make that treatment futile. In the example above, the treatment
that would result in four additional days of relatively pain-free con-
sciousness would presumably not be medically futile for either patient.
This would hold true even if one patient would opt for the procedure
to see relatives for one last time, but the other would not. Indeed, by
deeming treatment for the latter patient futile merely because it was
not desired, one risks undermining the notion that patients can refuse
nonfutile treatment.1
3 9
The example above suggests that the objective futility threshold
must be set low enough to allow an individual who is receiving treat-
ment to see a loved one for one last time, and also that medical treat-
ment should not be deemed futile merely because the patient does
not want additional treatment. 4 ' While it will not be easy to set the
correct futility threshold,' this neither implies that no reasonable
consensus can be reached nor that futility must include a patient-cen-
tered component.
Some commentators suggest that whenever a patient's values re-
quire that treatment be continued, those values should be
respected. 142 Yet, this attitude is not reflected in other areas of the
[W]hile one patient may refuse CPR because she is informed of the low likeli-
hood that she will ever leave the hospital, another patient may request that he be
resuscitated just for the chance that he might be alive to see the arrival of a close
relative, or his next birthday, or another sunrise.
Daar, supra note 48, at 1254.
139. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing patient autonomy and the
danger of equating futile treatment with treatment that does not promote the patient's
goals).
140. SeeJecker & Pearlman, supra note 104, at 1142 ("[T]here are treatments where a
broad community consensus holds that the quality of outcome associated with treatment
falls well below a threshold considered minimal.").
141. Another commentator notes:
What would constitute a reasonable minimum level of benefit, like many
other legal standards, is not easily reduced to a precise formula. Courts will have
to rely to some extent on physician discretion, but it is also important that they set
the threshold low enough to ensure that it provides meaningful protection for
persons with disabilities.
Orentlicher, supra note 40, at 72.
142. Cf Stem, supra note 50, at 1007 ("And if a patient is religiously commanded to
,choose life,' .. . then the state ought to honor that choice.").
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law. For example, doctors have been sanctioned for treating individu-
als in ways that not only were not harmful, but that actually afforded
patients relief unavailable from other treatments. 143 Were the pa-
tients' desires and values dispositive, doctors would not be punished for
treating patients in ways that the patients themselves desired and be-
lieved beneficial.
Consider cases in which individuals seek to force insurance com-
panies to pay for treatments that might have provided those individu-
als with their best hopes for survival."M Treatments that are not futile
may nonetheless be denied because there is a lack of consensus about
their efficacy. 45 Thus, an experimental therapy may be denied cover-
age, 1 46 even if there is substantial support for that treatment's effec-
tiveness. 147 The denial of coverage may mean that the patient who
cannot afford the cost of the treatment simply will be unable to re-
ceive that treatment.14 The patients who seek such therapy are not
143. See In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d 833, 835 (N.C. 1990) (holding that a physician could be
sanctioned even though "[tihere was no evidence that Guess' homeopathic treatment had
ever harmed a patient, and there was anecdotal evidence that Guess' homeopathic reme-
dies had provided relief to several patients who were apparently unable to obtain relief
through allopathic medicine").
144. See, e.g., Goepel v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, Civ. A. No. 93-3711 (JEI), 1993 WL
384498, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 1993) (acknowledging that "[t]here is a growing list of
medical treatments and procedures ... many of which have limited success rates, but many
of which might be viewed as the only hope of survival by a desperately ill patient," but
holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to insurance coverage for the treatment re-
quested even though this treatment could be characterized as possibly life-saving), vacated
sub nom. Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, Div. of LIUNA, 36 F.3d 306 (3d
Cir. 1994).
145. Consider the holding of one court:
[I] t is clear to the court that there is a lack of consensus within the medical pro-
fession regarding the appropriateness of using HDC-ABMT [high-dose chemo-
therapy with autologous bone marrow transplant] in the treatment of breast
cancer at this time. The court finds, however, that based on the evidence before
[the Office of Personnel Management], the agency's decision to exclude that
treatment from coverage is rational.
Reger v. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869, 872 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
146. See Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 951 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that an insurance company could partially deny "coverage based on the policy exclusion
for experimental treatment").
147. See Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan, 19 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding
the denial of coverage for treatment recommended by an oncologist); Harris v. Mutual of
Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding the denial of coverage, notwith-
standing the recommendation of a group of doctors referred to collectively as the "dream
team" of oncology, whose views were widely relied upon in the field).
148. See Barnett v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 32 F.3d 413, 415 (9th Cir. 1994)
("Both medical centers [UCLA and California Pacific], however, required that Barnett
gain certification from his insurance provider, or that Barnett pay $100,000 up front.");
Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804, 805 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he hospital
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asking to receive painful, futile treatments, 149 but instead to receive
treatments that may prolong their lives.15° Indeed, today's experi-
mental treatment might be tomorrow's highly recommended treat-
ment;15 1 therefore, denial of treatment based on a lack of coverage
might result in individuals being denied years of conscious life be-
cause they cannot pay the costs of treatment.
To some extent, insurance disputes are simply a matter of con-
tract law. 1 52 Ambiguous contracts may be construed to benefit the
insured, 5 although there is a trend to uphold clearly written exclu-
sions. 154 For purposes here, however, the issue is neither how to inter-
pret particular clauses' 55 nor whether insurance companies are
blameworthy for denying treatment,'56 but that insurance contracts
required that the Nesseims make an advance payment of $160,000 or obtain precertifica-
tion of coverage from the Plan.").
149. But cf Stern, supra note 50, at 1008 (suggesting that patients should be allowed to
.choose to endure possibly painful, futile treatments").
150. See Morreim, supra note 25, at 909 (suggesting that if anencephalic infants and
people in persistent vegetative states deserve treatment, then "we can hardly deny at least
that level of care to people who are conscious and suffering-for instance, women with
advanced breast cancer, whose only hope is an unproven but promising bone marrow
transplant").
151. See Loewy & Carlson, supra note 93, at 431 ("Therapy may be useless ('futile') today
and very successful (and the norm) tomorrow.").
152. See Mire v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 43 F.3d 567, 568 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)
("We conclude that the plain meaning of the exclusion eliminates coverage for this sug-
gested treatment for appellant's non-germ cell ovarian cancer."); Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life
Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1994) ("This clause in the contract clearly excludes
coverage for treatment that is of uncertain medical efficacy and subject to ongoing, recog-
nized and accepted medical research procedures."); Frendreis v. Blue Cross Blue Shield,
873 F. Supp. 1153, 1160 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (mem.) ("The Frendreis/BCBSM policy is ambigu-
ous and this Court therefore construes that ambiguity in favor of the insured and orders
Defendant to supply coverage for the proposed PSCR [peripheral stem cell recovery]
treatments.").
153. Cf Frendreis, 873 F. Supp. at 1160 ("[T]his Court therefore construes that ambiguity
in favor of the insured .... ').
154. See Daar, supra note 58, at 237 (discussing "a growing consensus among trial and
appellate courts that insurance companies may legitimately refuse to pay for HDCT-ABMT
[high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow transplant] if their written materi-
als clearly and unambiguously exclude the treatment from coverage").
155. See, e.g., Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 1379, 1382 (11th
Cir. 1993) ("Mutual of Omaha's interpretation excludes coverage, but other reasonable
interpretations may result in coverage.").
156. It is not claimed here, however, that insurance companies are entirely blameless.
See, e.g., Katy Chi-Wen Li, The Private Insurance Industry's Tactics Against Suspected Homosexu-
als: Redlining Based on Occupation, Residence and Marital Status, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 477, 495-
96 (1996) (describing insurance companies that redline based on presumed sexual orien-
tation, which, in turn, is to be an indicator for the likelihood of contracting the HIV virus,
despite the fact that the industry has not taken similar steps to screen out people with an
increased chance of getting other, more costly diseases).
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may well be based on the economics of treatment 57 or on other socie-
tal factors.'1 8 Given that patients are sometimes denied desired treat-
ments that would offer some chance of extended conscious life, it is
amazing that some commentators suggest that patient autonomy is be-
ing abridged if patients are not able to define for themselves what
constitutes futile treatment. 159 It is also amazing that some commen-
tators seem not to appreciate some of the other counterintuitive im-
plications of the position that patients themselves must be allowed to
define medical futility.1
60
F. Death
Brain death is defined as the death of the entire brain, including
the brain stem.' 6 ' An individual who is diagnosed as brain dead in
accord with accepted medical standards may be declared legally
dead.' 6
2
157. See Goepel v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, Civ. A. No. 93-3711 (JEI), 1993 WL
384498, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 1993) (referring to insurers who "attempt to avoid either
insolvency or soaring premiums by excluding expensive or innovative health care proce-
dures"), vacated sub nom. Goepel v. National Post Mail Handlers Union, Div. of LIUNA, 36
F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994).
158. Barnett v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 32 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 1994) (up-
holding the permissibility of considering which patients have the best chances of survival
when considering who will receive transplants of relatively scarce organs).
159. See Daar, supra note 48, at 1254 ("Any single definition of medical futility, be it
qualitative (focusing on the nature of individual benefit) or quantitative (focusing on the
degree of overall success), can be criticized for failing to include some component of indi-
vidual patient goals."); infra note 224.
160. See infra notes 161-171 and accompanying text (demonstrating that, on this view,
some brain-dead individuals might not be futile to treat whereas other individuals, with
identical conditions and prognoses, would not only be futile to "treat" but would be legally
dead).
161. See Strasser, supra note 107, at 788-94 (discussing the definition of death).
162. Several states have codified this rule:
In the case when respiratory and cardiac function are maintained by artificial
means, a person is considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a
medical doctor licensed in Alabama, based on usual and customary standards of
medical practice in the community for the determination by objective neurologi-
cal testing of total and irreversible cessation of brain function, there is total and
irreversible cessation of brain function. Death may be pronounced in this cir-
cumstance before artificial means of maintaining respiratory and cardiac function
are terminated.
ALA. CODE § 22-31-1(b) (1990).
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions in the en-
tire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be
made in accordance with accepted medical standards.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFErv CODE § 7180(a) (West Supp. 1997).
For legal and medical purposes, where respiratory and circulatory functions are
maintained by artificial means of support so as to preclude a determination that
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Consider an individual who is declared brain dead but whose par-
ents nonetheless insist that she be "treated.""16 If the parents are
obeyed, treatment may have to be offered for several weeks, because
modem technology can sustain cardiopulmonary functions for a sub-
stantial period even after total brain death has occurred. 1 64 If any
treatment is to be classified as futile, treating a dead peison would
seem to deserve that designation.
these functions have ceased, the occurrence of death may be determined where
there is the irreversible cessation of the functioning of the entire brain, including
the brain stem.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 382.009(1) (West 1993).
(1) An individual who has sustained either of the following is dead:
(a) Irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions.
(b) Irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including
the brain stem.
(2) A determination of death shall be made in accordance with accepted
medical standards.
MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 333.1033 (West 1992).
An individual who has sustained either irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions or irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain, including the brainstem, is dead. A determination of death must be made
in accordance with accepted medical standards.
MoNr. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1995).
The determination that a person is dead shall be made by a physician li-
censed to practice medicine applying ordinary and accepted standards of medical
practice. Brain death, defined as irreversible cessation of total brain function,
may be used as a sole basis for the determination that a person has died, particu-
larly when brain death occurs in the presence of artificially maintained respira-
tory and circulatory functions.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323 (1993).
An individual is dead if he has sustained either irreversible cessation of circu-
latory and respiratory functions or irreversible cessation of all functions of the
brain, including the brain stem, as determined in accordance with accepted med-
ical standards. If the respiratory and circulatory functions of a person are being
artificially sustained, under accepted medical standards a determination that
death has occurred is made by a physician by observing and conducting a test to
determine that the irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain has
occurred.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (Anderson 1994).
163. See Daar, supra note 58, at 228 (discussing a case in which the daughter was de-
clared dead but the parents insisted on further treatment).
164. See Friedman, supra note 118, at 965 ("[Clardiopulmonary functions have been
reported to survive for as long as sixty-eight days after complete loss of brain functions.").
Individuals who have suffered upper-brain death may nonetheless survive indefinitely:
[Tiwo neurologists .... agreed that within a reasonable degree of medical cer-
tainty, Fiori's condition would not improve and he would remain in a PVS as he
had done for the last seventeen years. They also stated that existing medical tech-
nology could continue to support Fiori's life functions so that his life span could
extend for another ten to twenty years.
In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 909 (Pa. 1996).
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Arguably, in the example above, the parents' treatment demand
could be rejected because the patient is no longer alive.' 65 Even if
each member of the family belongs to a particular religious group that
rejects brain death as an appropriate criterion for death,166 it will not
matter unless there is a legal exception for individuals having such
beliefs. After all, the patient is dead according to acceptable medical
criteria and thus should not be treated. 167
Suppose, however, that this family lives in a jurisdiction where an
exception has been made such that individuals whose religious beliefs
preclude using brain death as the definition of death will not be de-
clared dead according to that criterion. 168 Given the exception, treat-
ment for this patient could not be ruled out on the ground that the
patient was legally dead. Further treatment would maintain the "indi-
vidual's" respiratory and cardiac functions and thus could not be
ruled out on a purely quantitative notion of futility.169 Assuming that
this individual had previously expressed a desire to be treated under
these circumstances, and assuming that the patient-centered notion of
futility should control, treatment would not be futile for this
patient. 1
70
To make matters more surprising, suppose that there is another
individual identical to the first patient in all respects, except that this
latter patient had not rejected brain death as a criterion of death.
165. The hospital did not take this position, however. See Daar, supra note 58, at 228.
166. See Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. Rv. 195, 213-
14 (1996) ("Some deeply religious communities, particularly the Japanese and Jewish or-
thodox communities, have refused the brain-death criterion." (footnotes omitted)); Char-
lotte K. Goldberg, Choosing Life After Death: Respecting Religious Beliefs and Moral Convictions
in Near Death Decisions, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1197, 1214-15 (1988) ("[Alccording to some
Orthodox Jewish legal scholars 'brain death and irreversible coma are not acceptable defi-
nitions of death .... ' Similarly, other cultures such as Native American and some Japanese
do not recognize brain death." (footnotes omitted) (ellipsis in original)).
167. Cf In reWelfare of Bowman, 617 P.2d 731, 732 (Wash. 1980) (en banc) ("We hold
that it is for law to define the standard of death, that the brain death standard should be
adopted, and that it is for the medical profession to determine the applicable criteria-in
accordance with accepted medical standards-for deciding whether brain death is
present.").
168. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-5 (West 1996) (authorizing an exemption from the use
of brain-death criterion to establish death for those individuals for whom such a determi-
nation would violate their personal religious beliefs); see also Goldberg, supra note 166, at
1254 ("In New York, reasonable accommodation of religious or moral beliefs is required
before completing a determination of death using brain death criteria.").
169. See supra notes 122-134 and accompanying text (discussing quantitative judgments
of futility).
170. Cf supra notes 101-121 and accompanying text (discussing qualitative judgments of
futility). But see Stem, supra note 50, at 1008 ("[Some scholars] question whether a person
insisting on futile treatment has made an informed decision, apparently no matter how
much medical knowledge they [sic] have.").
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There would be two individuals with identical conditions and prog-
noses, one of whom would be dead and the other of whom would not
only not be dead but also would not be futile to treat.'
A separate question, not the subject of this Article, is whether
states should accommodate this rejection of the brain-death criterion
for death. Commentators advocating such an accommodation
172
seem not to appreciate some of the ramifications of such a position.
For example, a particular individual could be considered dead in one
state and not in another, even though her condition would not have
changed.173 Even if the counterintuitive implications of a person's be-
ing able to opt out of a particular definition of death are not fatal to
allowing such an exception, and even if it is within the state's preroga-
tive to create such an exception, individuals should not deserve to be
able to define what constitutes death just because they have lived ac-
cording to certain precepts during their lifetimes. So, too, individuals
should not be allowed to define futility for themselves merely because
they have lived in accord with a certain tradition. 74 While their hav-
ing lived according to a certain custom might establish the sincerity of
their beliefs, it would not establish their right to define important
medical or legal concepts as they see fit.
Perhaps it would seem surprising that the state would be in a posi-
tion to declare who is and who is not dead, because this might appear
quite straightforwardly to be a medical matter. Yet, as the Supreme
Court of Washington has observed, "Death is both a legal and medical
question. "175 Courts have suggested that it is for the law to determine
what constitutes death, which means that either a court or a legisla-
ture could make the relevant decision.
176
171. Some commentators would not classify this situation as problematic. See, e.g., Stem,
supra note 50, at 1008 ("People who have lived their whole lives in accordance with a reli-
gious tradition should be accorded the courtesy-dare I say respect-of living their last
hours and days in accordance with that tradition.").
172. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 166, at 1243 (advocating the view that the individual's
death preferences should be respected).
173. See Annas, supra note 91, at 878 ("In 1981, there were seven different brain death
statutes. So theoretically (but not really) you could put someone in an ambulance in Cali-
fornia and drive them across the country to Pennsylvania and they'd be dead, alive, alive,
dead, alive, dead, dead, alive, dead, dead, and arrive in Pennsylvania alive.").
174. But see supra note 171.
175. In re Welfare of Bowman, 617 P.2d 731, 734 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); accord Swaf-
ford v. State, 421 N.E.2d 596, 601 (Ind. 1981) ("The determination of what condition
constitutes death, however, can no longer be regarded exclusively as a medical question.").
176. Bowman, 617 P.2d at 732 ("We hold that it is for law to define the standard of
death."). In some states, courts have made the decision. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gol-
ston, 366 N.E.2d 744, 748-49 (Mass. 1977) (upholding the use of the brain-death definition
to determine "death"); Bowman, 617 P.2d at 732 ("We hold . .. that the brain death stan-
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If a legislature can adopt a definition of death, it can also modify
that definition, 17 7 as long as constitutional guarantees are not thereby
violated.1 78  Some commentators suggest that legislatures should be
permitted to adopt an upper-brain death criterion for death. 179 Thus,
an individual who had suffered neocortical death could be considered
legally dead.
This recommendation is more easily understood if one considers
that the brain dies in stages, with the upper brain dying first.18° Once
the upper brain dies, the person will be without consciousness. 181
Commentators suggest that because consciousness and self-awareness
dard should be adopted."). In other states, legislatures have decided. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 22-31-1(b) (1990) (offering criteria for death); CAL. HEALTH & SAETY CODE § 7180(a)
(West Supp. 1997) (offering criteria for death); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 382.009(1) (West 1993)
(discussing when brain death criteria are applicable); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.1033
(West 1992) (defining death); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1995) (defining death);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323 (1993) (defining brain death); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30
(Anderson 1994) (explaining when death has occurred). See also supra note 162 for the
language of these statutes.
177. See, e.g., In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 593 (Fla. 1992) (discussing the 1988 Florida
Legislature's consideration of a bill to modify the definition of death); Friedman, supra
note 118, at 936-37 (discussing a proposal to amend the California definition of death to
include anencephaly); Lisa E. Hanger, The Legal, Ethical, and Medical Objections to Procuring
Organs from Anencephalic Infants, 5 HEALTH MATRx 347, 352 (1995) (discussing the same
proposal); Brandon, supra note 47, at 795 (discussing the same proposal); Kathleen L.
Paliokas, Note, Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors: An Assessment of "Death" and Legisla-
tive Policy, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197, 206 (1989) (discussing the same proposal).
178. One commentator suggests that if the states' definitions of "death" vary too
broadly, a "federal interest" may ultimately provide an impetus for a constitutional check
on the states' powers of establishing such a definition:
A fixed federal definition of Fourteenth Amendment personhood avoids the
possibility of aberrant states adopting extremely narrow or extremely broad defi-
nitions of "persons." . . .
The case for the variable definition of personhood rests on the likelihood
that states will not differ significantly in who they consider to be "not dead," and
therefore "persons." If disagreement between the states is limited to the question
of whether a "whole brain" or "upper brain" standard should be applied, the fed-
eral interest in imposing a federal standard diminishes.
Douglas 0. Under, The Other Right-to-Life Debate: When Does Fourteenth Amendment "Life"
End?, 37 Aiuz. L. REv. 1183, 1195-96 (1995).
179. See Ducor, supra note 166, at 215 (discussing the adoption of a higher-brain-death
definition of "death"); cf Friedman, supra note 118, at 959 (suggesting that legislatures
should be allowed to adopt a definition of "death" that would classify anencephalic infants
as dead).
180. See DAVID W. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING § 2:2, at 12
(1981) (describing the process by which the brain dies).
181. See Paliokas, supra note 177, at 202 ("During the brain death period, the brain itself
dies in stages with the cerebral or higher function centers, including consciousness and
intelligent thought, dying first and the lower centers, including the brain stem, which
maintains respiration and circulation, dying last.").
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are the characteristics that make us human, 8 2 there is an important
sense in which individuals without those capacities are already
dead."8 ' Precisely because modern technology can keep "individuals"
alive even though they will never regain consciousness or, perhaps,
have any brain activity at all, it may well be that a new definition of
death is necessary.1 84
One difficulty posed by adopting a new definition of death is that
individuals may incorrectly be diagnosed as dead; such misdiagnoses
could result from the difficulties inherent in the new criteria's applica-
tion. 8 5 For example, if an upper-brain death criterion of death is
adopted, it may be difficult to distinguish between someone in a
locked-in state and someone who is neocortically dead.8 6 Further,
182. One commentator notes:
According to the [bodily-integrity] concept's dictates, a patient who possesses
bodily integrity, either natural or mechanically imposed, but who has lost the
capacity for consciousness and self-awareness, remains a live person. Yet such a
person has lost all ability to experience the world, including all those experiences
that give life its humanity, such as sensation, perception of a self through time,
choice between alternative courses of action, reflection, communication, and
emotion.
Tom Stacy, Death, Privacy, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 77 CORNELL L. RExv. 490, 505
(1992); accord Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 345 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (" [F] or patients.., who have no consciousness and no chance of
recovery, there is a serious question as to whether the mere persistence of their bodies is
'life' as that word is commonly understood, or as it is used in both the Constitution and the
Declaration of Independence." (emphasis omitted)); Dresser, supra note 114, at 662
(" [P] ermanently unconscious patients themselves are incapable of possessing any interests,
in the usual meaning of the term." (emphasis omitted)); Schrode, supra note 44, at 1644
("Several commentators have suggested that this standard is problematic because it classi-
fies patients who have lost the capacity for self-awareness and consciousness as being alive,
despite the fact that these are the very characteristics that make us human.").
183. See Stacy, supra note 182, at 528 ("[T]he permanently unconscious are, like artifi-
cially maintained brain-dead patients, already dead."); 2 W. NOEL KEYES, LirE, DEATH, AND
THE LAw 646 (1995) (stating that upper-brain death destroys all capacity for conscious
thought and is therefore the death of the person).
184. One court has observed:
[W]e are on the threshold of new terrain-the penumbra where death begins but
life, in some form, continues. We have been led to it by the medical miracles
which now compel us to distinguish between "death," as we have known it, and
death in which the body lives in some fashion but the brain (or a significant part
of it) does not.
Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 421 A-2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1980) (en banc).
185. Cf In re Alvarado, 550 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (App. Div. 1990) (mem.) (vacating an
order permitting a hospital to remove life-support systems, because the infant on the sys-
tems did not have any indications of brain death).
186. One commentator explains:
A closely related problem is the difficulty of distinguishing between a patient
who is neocortically dead and one who exists in the state known as "locked-in
syndrome." Those in the latter category have undergone paralysis of all four
lower extremities and the lower cranial nerves, yet retain consciousness, and
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additional concerns might be raised if there were an appearance of
arbitrariness in how death was defined.1 8 7 For example, were death
redefined to include anencephalic infants so that their organs might
be harvested,1 88 public confidence might be undermined in the con-
sistency and nonarbitrariness of the definition of death.
Yet, these arguments prove too much. One of the reasons that
brain death was adopted in the first place was to facilitate organ trans-
plants. 189 Thus, it is not clear that changing the definition of death
out of a desire to facilitate transplantation would undermine public
confidence in that definition. Further, the suggestion is not that up-
per-brain death be adopted as the definition to enable organs of the
permanently unconscious to be transplanted, but merely that the defi-
nition of death should be related in a direct and important way to the
qualities which make individuals essentially human.19 ° Finally, while
the possibility of mistakes might give reason for pause, mistakes are
made even using the current definition of death. 91 In any event, it
would seem that adequate safeguards could be developed to prevent
misdiagnosis. 92
Putting aside the controversy surrounding the appropriate defini-
tion of death, courts are not consistent with respect to the application
of the term "death," even when using the current definition involving
whole-brain death. Consider an individual who is completely brain
dead and who is being kept "alive" on life support so that her organs
can be harvested. Insofar as such an individual is alive, it might seem
that the doctors removing her kidneys, rather than the person who
therefore can not [sic] be grouped with neocortically dead patients who have lost
all consciousness. Because those suffering from "locked-in syndrome" cannot
communicate with others, their condition mimics that of a neocortically dead
patient.
Friedman, supra note 118, at 961 (footnote omitted).
187. See Brandon, supra note 47, at 819 ("Redefining death would create confusion and
call into question the validity of brain death criteria: Is society manipulating this most
fundamental concept to serve its immediate social needs?").
188. See id. at 795 (discussing a proposal to modify the California definition of death to
include anencephaly).
189. Robert L. Geltzer et al., National Conference on Birth, Death, and Law, 29JUIMETFJCS
J. 403, 422 (1989); Goldberg, supra note 166, at 1204; James M.Jordan III, Note, Incubating
for the State: The Precarious Autonomy of Persistently Vegetative and Brain-Dead Pregnant Women,
22 GA. L. REv. 1103, 1162 (1988); Paliokas, supra note 177, at 204.
190. See 2 KEYES, supra note 183, at 646 ("It would appear that the concept of death
based upon the neocortex may be the most humane test possible to differentiate us from
animals.").
191. See, e.g., In re Alvarado, 550 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (App. Div. 1990) (mem.) (holding
that the infant was wrongly diagnosed as dead).
192. See Strasser, supra note 107, at 790 (suggesting that if proper procedures are fol-
lowed, misdiagnosis can be avoided).
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had brought about the patient's condition, would be "killing" the pa-
tient.1 9 3 Not surprisingly, courts have not held doctors responsible for
the deaths in these kinds of cases, and they have upheld the murder
convictions of the individuals who had caused the victims' brain
deaths.19 4 Yet, if indeed the "patient" is "dead" even before "life-sup-
port" has been terminated, it would seem that the dead body should
be turned over for burial rather than kept "alive" for the possible har-
vesting of organs.195 Court decisions on these matters yield the con-
clusion that the same individual can be legally dead for certain
purposes but not for others.196
G. The Futility of Treating Those Who Are Upper-Brain Dead
Whether one believes that the appropriate definition of death in-
volves whole-brain or upper-brain death, a separate question is
whether treatment of individuals who have suffered upper-brain death
is nonfutile. Even given the currently accepted definition of brain
death,' 97 the state might declare certain individuals legally dead (e.g.,
individuals with no brain functioning whatsoever), while declaring
other individuals alive but not appropriate candidates for treatment
(e.g., those who have no hope for restoration of upper-brain
functioning) .198
193. See Cranmore v. State, 271 N.W.2d 402, 427 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978) (discussing the
defendants' suggestion that "the death of Dennis O'Bradovich [the victim] was caused by
the actions of his attending physicians in performing a nephrectomy (removal of kidneys)
and in discontinuing the respirator and the administration of pressor drugs (artificial aids
to maintain blood pressure in the body).").
194. See People v. Bonilla, 467 N.Y.S.2d 599, 609 (App. Div. 1983) (upholding such a
conviction, even though the victim was artificially maintained to harvest the kidneys and
the spleen), affd sub nom. People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 1984); Cranmore, 271
N.W.2d at 428 (upholding such a murder conviction).
195. But see Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 507 A.2d 718, 725 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1986) ("Before the life support systems were disconnected, there was no dead
body to be claimed for burial."), afi'd in part, rev'd in par 538 A.2d 346 (N.J. 1988). The
NewJersey Supreme Court reversed Strachan on the "dead"/"alive" issue, holding that the
hospital had a duty to deliver the "dead" body to the patient's parents as soon as the pa-
tient had been declared brain dead. Strachan, 538 A.2d at 351.
196. Cf Goldberg, supra note 166, at 1244 ("Both the medical and legal profession seem
equipped to apply different definitions [of death] in different contexts.").
197. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
198. See Schneiderman et al., supra note 50, at 952 ("In keeping with the qualitative
notion of futility we propose that any treatment that merely preserves permanent uncon-
sciousness or that fails to end total dependence on intensive medical care should be re-
garded as nonbeneficial and, therefore, futile."). But see Lantos et al., supra note 70, at 83
(suggesting that "prolonged nutritional support for patients in a persistent vegetative state"
is not futile).
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When discussing why it is futile to treat someone who has suffered
upper-brain death, numerous reasons might be offered, including the
inefficacy of the treatment 99 or the fact that the treatment will not
benefit the patient.2 00 Indeed, when considering someone who is not
and never will be conscious, it is difficult to understand how treatment
will benefit that patient,201 because she will never have any knowledge
or understanding of what has or has not been done and will never feel
any pleasure or pain in any event.
20 2
An additional reason offered to support the nontreatment of the
permanently unconscious is that therapy for such individuals seems to
be a poor allocation of scarce resources. However, the futility and the
resource-allocation arguments are separate and distinct, and they
should not be conflated.
H. Rationing
One issue involves determining which treatments are futile, and a
different issue involves determining which treatments should be ra-
tioned. Rationing and futilityjudgments are distinguishable: The for-
mer involves decisions about which beneficial treatments will not be
provided, while the latter involves judgments about which treatments
will not in fact provide benefit.
20 3
It is important not to conflate these issues by, for example, in-
cluding considerations of economic concerns within the definition of
medical futility20 4 or by, perhaps, using futility as a mask to justify a
199. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text (discussing the futility-as-having-no-
effect definition of futility).
200. See supra notes 57-78 and accompanying text (discussing the net-benefit definition
of futility).
201. See Ann MacLean Massie, Withdrawal of Treatment for Minors in a Persistent Vegetative
State: Parents Should Decide, 35 Aiuz. L. Rzv. 173, 204 (1993) ("Anyone suffering a total loss
of consciousness is incapable of 'benefitting' from continued life support.").
202. See Angell, supra note 53, at 512 ("Because she was in a persistent vegetative state,
Mrs. Wanglie was incapable of suffering.").
203. One commentator explains the distinction as follows:
When a given treatment is deemed to be futile, the implication is that it has no
therapeutic benefit. Futility decisions do not rest on the fact that there are scarce
resources. Rationing, however, implies that the treatment may provide a thera-
peutic benefit, but concerns of cost and allocation of limited resources dictate
that the treatment not be given.
Smith, supra note 53, at 15 (footnotes omitted); accord Schneiderman & Jecker, supra note
58, at 437 ("It is particularly important .. . to distinguish futility (implying no apparent
therapeutic benefit) from rationing (acknowledging therapeutic benefit but raising ques-
tions about cost-worthiness)."). But see Scofield, supra note 27, at 929 (suggesting that futil-
ity decisions and rationing decisions are not distinguishable).
204. See Boozang, supra note 86, at 75 ("There is great danger in confusing the issues of
physiologically futile treatment and allocation of scarce health care resources.").
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policy that is really economically driven.2"' Further, it is important
not to be reductionistic and combine notions of futility and rationing
by suggesting that they both involve the issue of whether the patient
will in fact receive the treatment, 20 6 because the justification for not
offering a treatment would be quite different depending upon
whether futility or rationing was involved.
When rationing is discussed, two separate questions must be ad-
dressed: (1) whether a particular treatment will be provided, and (2)
who will pay for that treatment if it is provided. 20 7 Some commenta-
tors suggest that even futile care should be provided as long as society
does not have to pay for it.2° 8 However, such an analysis may be too
superficial, because indirect costs may not be counted in such calcula-
tions.2°9 Thus, if insurance must pay for care that is futile, other types
of care might have to be sacrificed.2 10 Even if care did not have to be
205. See Loewy & Carlson, supra note 93, at 430 ("It is, however, another matter to base
such decisions on an excuse of futility than to grapple with the question of discontinuing
treatment in some persons because it is both unlikely (albeit not impossible) to succeed
and is, furthermore, terribly expensive.").
A separate question involves how expensive it will be to give futile care. See Sorum,
supra note 130, at 622 (suggesting that offering one kind of futile care would involve "po-
tentially enormous psychological and economic costs").
206. See Goepel v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, Civ. A. No. 93-3711 UEI), 1993 WL
384498, at *1 (D.NJ. Sept. 24, 1993) ("'Rationing' is an ugly word when used to describe
the process by which society decides what medical procedures and services will generally be
made available to the public."), vacated sub nom. Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers
Union, Div. of LIUNA, 36 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994).
207. Cf Boozang, supra note 86, at 75 ("The need for reallocation of health care re-
sources may be an appropriate reason for society to consider whether it is willing to pay for
futile treatment for a dying patient.").
208. See Goldberg, supra note 166, at 1246 ("The simplest answer is that the individual
who desires the continued care should bear the burden of paying for it."); Morreim, supra
note 25, at 915 ("If our objective in these difficult areas is to respect citizens' diverging
viewpoints, we must draw stringent limits on the amount of funding that we conscript from
unwilling citizens to fund exotic health care."); Veatch & Spicer, supra note 51, at 30
("[W]e see no reason to prohibit private arrangements to provide it, as long as these ar-
rangements do not draw on resources needed for others."); Schrode, supra note 44, at
1666 ("Arguably, it is unjust to allow public funds to sustain the biological lives of some
patients without regard to cost or quality of life, while others have no access to even the
most basic necessities. If individuals . .. [can afford] nonbeneficial care, they will be al-
lowed to [finance it]." (footnote omitted)).
209. See Morreim, supra note 25, at 912 ("Ultimately, the money [for exoticare] comes
from private individuals who pay premiums either directly through their pockets, or indi-
rectly through taxes, consumer prices, and the diminution of wages and other employee
benefits that inevitably accompanies a rise in health premiums.").
210. See id. at 917-18 ("If a health plan is required to provide exoticare on the massive
scale implied by the Baby K case, [insurance] subscribers would have substantially less ac-
cess to the 'basicare' . . . . In short, subscribers could expect to wait longer for routine
appointments and have substantially fewer choices of providers, tests, and treatments."); cf.
Veatch & Spicer, supra note 51, at 30 ("[E]fficiency and equity require that coverage be
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sacrificed, and patients did not have to forego possibly beneficial
treatments, there would still remain the difficulty of doctors' prescrib-
ing treatments that they themselves consider futile.211
I. Who Defines Futility
Some commentators contend that it is inappropriate for individ-
ual doctors to make decisions about what constitutes futile treatment.
These commentators base their belief on two factors: (1) doctors
tend to overestimate the difficulties associated with living with particu-
lar handicaps;"' and (2) doctors may allow nonmedical factors like
race to play a role in decisionmaking. 211 Some of these theorists sug-
gest that if medical societies, rather than individual doctors, decided
which treatments were futile, it would be less likely that mistaken poli-
cies would be adopted.2 14
Yet, if the relevant decisions were made by medical communities,
the difficulties posed by individual doctors' making such decisions
excluded [from patients in a persistent vegetative state] in order to allocate those re-
sources to those who have stronger moral claims."); Dzielak, supra note 62, at 760
("[F]utile death-delaying treatment places a great financial burden on society. Death-de-
laying medical treatment for permanently vegetative patients costs approximately $7 bil-
lion in resources annually." (footnote omitted)).
211. See infra notes 238-245 and accompanying text (discussing physicians treating pa-
tients in a manner contrary to their professional consciences).
212. Cf Boozang, supra note 86, at 37-38 ("Evidence indicates .. . that the physician's
judgment about the patient's quality of life frequently clouds his determination of whether
CPR should be provided to the patient."); Scofield, supra note 27, at 934 ("[T] here is some
reason to believe that attitudes and beliefs about persons with disabilities can and do affect
decisions about the sort of treatment such persons are to receive, including decisions
about medically futile treatment."); Sorum, supra note 130, at 623 ("Physicians tend.., to
underestimate how the patient rates his or her quality of life.").
213. See Boozang, supra note 86, at 38 ("[T]he presence of nonmedical factors such as
mental retardation, dementia, age, institutionalization, or a history of violent crime and
drug abuse have been found to affect physician decisions to resuscitate patients."); Smith,
supra note 53, at 3 ("[E]xtraneous factors such as race, wealth, gender, and age of the
patient, as well as judgments on the quality of the patient's life and concerns with cost
containment, may cloud a physician's determination to withhold or withdraw treatment.");
StuartJ. Youngner, Medical Futility and the Social Contract (Who Are the Real Doctors on Howard
Brody's Island?), 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1015, 1021 (1995) ("A recent study... found that
the non-white race of the patient independently predicted a futilityjudgment resulting in a
DNR [do-not-resuscitate] order.").
214. See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 29, at 200 ("[S]ome commentators suggest that the
development of standards regarding futile treatment should proceed on an institutional
basis, for example, by professional medical societies or hospital ethics committees. These
bodies are judged less likely to be influenced by objectionable biases." (footnotes omit-
ted)); Miles, supra note 69, at 881 ("Professional societies must assume a leading role in
proposing [a] standard of care [that will serve to define medical futility], which in turn
must face and survive public scrutiny and debate." (footnote omitted)).
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might simply be replicated on a larger scale.2" 5 If, indeed, there is a
generalized bias within the profession, it is not at all clear that a gen-
eral consensus that a treatment was futile would establish that the
treatment was in fact futile.
216
Recognizing that there may be a bias within the profession, some
commentators suggest that society as a whole should decide which
treatments are futile.2 1 7 Yet, the tendency to undervalue the lives of
individuals with disabilities might be something of which society as a
whole is guilty.218
Individual doctors, medical societies, and even society as a whole
may undervalue the lives of individuals with particular disabilities; this
does not, however, establish that no decisions about the definition of
futility can be made. If it is true, for example, that people without any
upper-brain activity simply have no consciousness, 219 then one would
be hard-pressed to charge that there may be a serious undervaluing of
what it is like for such a person to live. While the tendency to under-
value the lives of individuals with disabilities underscores the need to
establish a very low level below which treatment would be deemed
futile,2 20 it is neither impossible to set such a standard 2 21 nor impossi-
ble for physicians to apply it.22 2 However, it will be important to be
vigilant to assure that the official standards are in fact applied,
whatever they might be.22 3
215. See Crossley, supra note 29, at 200 (stating that critics contend that "delegating
those decisions to groups of medical professionals still grants too great a prerogative to
groups whose values may depart from societal values").
216. This has not been appreciated by some commentators. See, e.g., Shiner, supra note
42, at 846 ("The refusal of all available medical providers to consider providing allegedly
futile treatment may signal a medical consensus that such treatment truly is futile.").
217. Schrode, supra note 44, at 1613 ("Developing an appropriate policy for perma-
nently unconscious patients requires a social consensus.").
218. See Orentlicher, supra note 40, at 69 ("When persons without disabilities are asked
to estimate the quality of life of persons with disabilities, their estimates are often consider-
ably lower than the ratings given by persons with disabilities when they are asked to evalu-
ate their own quality of life.").
219. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
220. Cf Orentlicher, supra note 40, at 72 ("What would constitute a reasonable mini-
mum level of benefit, like many other legal standards, is not easily reduced to a precise
formula.").
221. Cf. Schneiderman et al., supra note 50, at 952 (suggesting that some "sorts of quali-
tatively poor results fall outside the range of the patient's autonomy and need not be of-
fered as options").
222. Cf Daniel Callahan, Medical Futility, Medical Necessity: The-Problem-Without-a-Name,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 30, 32 (advocating that physicians be allowed to
make decisions "on the basis of societally generated standards").
223. Cf In re Finn, 625 N.Y.S.2d 809, 812 (Sup. Ct.) (explaining that two physicians
claimed that treatment of an individual with an I.Q. of approximately 20 would be futile,
even though there was "no evidence before the court, never mind evidence demonstrating
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III. AUTONOMY
Many debates about the concept of medical futility at least implic-
itly involve the concern that patient autonomy will be sacrificed if
medical futility is to be given any substantive content at all.224 Yet,
patient autonomy is not endangered by giving futility substantive con-
tent as long as the proper scope of patient autonomy is understood,
the meaning of futility is not overinclusive, and the justification for
the definition does not itself undermine futility.
A. Patient Versus Physician
The futility debate is sometimes characterized as simply a deci-
sion about whether the doctor's or the patient's values will tri-
umph.225 Such a characterization is misleading in a number of
respects. It is at best unhelpful to suggest that the debate over futility
is a dispute between the doctor and her patient, because it may in fact
be others who are setting the criteria for futility-medical boards,
Congress, an administrative agency, the American Medical Associa-
tion, or society at large.226
Consider a patient who, while still competent, had expressed a
desire to receive treatment regardless of her condition or prognosis.
At least one issue would involve how such a statement should be
to a reasonable medical certainty, that [the individual's] present medical condition would
make CPR a medically futile treatment"), modified sub nom. Finn v. Leonard C., 634
N.Y.S.2d 262 (App. Div. 1995).
224. See Shiner, supra note 42, at 842 ("Recognizing futility as a legal concept would
seriously undermine patients' rights.").
225. Cf Boozang, supra note 86, at 71 ("Vesting in the physician the power to arbitrate
what constitutes reasonable patient decisions and rationales which deserve respect ...
establishes as superior the physician's values, culture, beliefs and decision-making
process.").
226. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 142.62 (1997) (Department of State provision prohibiting dis-
crimination against handicapped persons); 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (1996) (Department of
Health and Human Services regulations implementing the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106g (West Supp. 1997)); 45 C.F.R. § 1340 app. (1996)
(Interpretative Guidelines Regarding 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15-Services and Treatment for Dis-
abled Infants); Barnett v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 32 F.3d 413, 415 (9th Cir. 1994)
(discussing the role of the Permanente Medical Group's Liver Transplant Advisory Board,
a committee of liver specialists, in deciding who should be candidates for organ trans-
plant); Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 845 (Ct. App. 1988) (discussing the
AMA view on treating the irreversibly comatose); Brandon, supra note 47, at 811-12 (sug-
gesting that the amended federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act allows treat-
ment to be withheld from anencephalic infants); cf. Morreim, supra note 25, at 925
(arguing that EMTALA and the ADA could be narrowly interpreted with respect to the
health care they require to be provided).
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treated.22 v Certainly, her expressed desires could be respected.228
However, if those wishes are not to be honored, some justification
would seem to be required, because such a refusal appears to involve a
clear disregard of the patient's autonomy.
Patients do not have a right to demand treatment under any and
all circumstances, so it need not be a denial of autonomy to refuse to
accede to certain patient requests. 229 The difficulty will be in deciding
which requests may be denied (e.g., whether a request could be de-
nied if the patient would not be able to appreciate the life extension
were it given).230
Any policy limiting patient autonomy must be narrowly drawn.
Otherwise, the policy might be used to override the patient's wishes
with respect to nontreatment 2 1 or with respect to receiving painful
therapy that might afford additional days or weeks of conscious life.2 3 2
It is suggested here that the concept of futility should be robust
enough to honor a request for nontreatment if, indeed, the request-
ing patient could reliably be predicted never to regain conscious-
ness,233 but weak enough to classify as nonfutile those treatments that
may yield extra conscious life.23 4
Some commentators suggest that the real issue is not whether a
particular treatment is futile but, rather, who should decide whether
the particular treatment should be administered. 235 This is correct to
some extent, in that for a certain range of choices the patient (or
surrogate) should be making the relevant decision.236 The prefera-
ble, more finely grained approach, however, allows the patient or sur-
227. See Linder, supra note 178, at 1201-02 (suggesting that the clarity with which the
patient expresses a desire to continue vegetative existence may play a role in eventual
decisionmaking).
228. See Angell, supra note 53, at 512 (suggesting that absent a change in the definition
of "death," autonomous wishes may have to be accepted).
229. But see supra note 224.
230. Cf Rhoden, supra note 32, at 1314 (attaching great importance to the ability of the
dying patient to appreciate the additional days that treatment could offer).
231. Cf In reFiori, 673 A.2d 905, 910 (Pa. 1996) ("Courts have unanimously concluded
that this right to self-determination does not cease upon the incapacitation of the
individual.").
232. See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text (discussing the potential value of
extending life for a few days).
233. Cf supra note 164 (explaining how bodily organs may survive and function indefi-
nitely after brain death).
234. Cf supra note 63 and accompanying text (noting that the Baby K ruling requires
care to be provided to all patients whose lives might be extended).
235. See Angell, supra note 53, at 511 (suggesting that the important consideration is the
decisionmaker rather than the decision's content).
236. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of respect-
ing patient autonomy in certain instances).
1998]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 57:505
rogate to make some choices but not those that fall in the range
involving futile treatment (i.e., where futility has been appropriately
defined) 27
It is simply incorrect to suggest that the futility debate is a battle
pitting the patient's autonomy against the physician's conscience.238
Patient autonomy does not give patients the right to make all deci-
sions, including, for example, the appropriate criteria for death.23 9
Thus, as long as the concept is limited to a narrow range of treatments
that offer no hope of restoring consciousness, one should not think
that patient autonomy includes the right to define futility.
Commentators who claim that physicians cannot be forced to ad-
minister treatment when doing so would violate their consciences
overstate the case, because the physician's conscience-based objection
must be in accord with generally accepted medical standards.240 If the
237. SeeJecker & Pearlman, supra note 104, at 1142 ("[I]tis not paternalistic to refuse to
honor a patient's request for futile treatment, because patients are not considered entitled
to futile treatment in the first place.").
238. Cf United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965) ("To require
these doctors to ignore the mandates of their own conscience, even in the name of free
religious exercise, cannot be justified under these circumstances. The patient may know-
ingly decline treatment, but he may not demand mistreatment."); Findlay v. Board of
Sup'rs, 230 P.2d 526, 532 (Ariz. 1951) (Phelps,J., specially concurring) ("Itwould not only
not be professional but it would be highly unprofessional for a physician to assist in the
performance of an operation which he believed to be unnecessary or unwise to perform at
that time."); Conservatorship of Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 531 (Ct. App. 1988) ("[W]e
hold that a conservator can authorize the removal of a nasogastric feeding tube from a
conservatee who is in a persistent vegetative state, but cannot [necessarily] require physi-
cians to remove the tube against their personal moral objections."); Grace Plaza, Inc. v.
Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 859 (App. Div. 1992) ("While we recognize the right of a patient
to control the course of his or her treatment, we do not recognize any right to force a
health-care provider to render treatment which is contrary to his or her own conscience."),
affd, 623 N.E.2d 513 (N.Y. 1993); Smolin, supra note 87, at 990 ("[P]hysicians or other
medical care providers generally should not be penalized for refusing to provide treat-
ments that violate their religious conscience."); Dzielak, supra note 62, at 759 ("Compelled
futile medical treatment compromises physician ethics and morals. Physicians have the
responsibility to abstain from administering or continuing futile treatment." (footnotes
omitted)); Nealy, supra note 22, at 157 ("Medical ethics do not permit patients to require a
physician to render treatment that, in the physician's judgment, would be futile or other-
wise medically inappropriate. It is ethical for a physician to refuse to accede to such a
demand.").
239. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (noting that it is the duty of the medical
profession to determine the criteria for death).
240. See In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 412 (N.J. 1987) ("[A] patient has no right to compel
a health-care provider to violate generally accepted professional standards."); Daar, supra
note 48, at 1246 ("Assertion of a physician's professional conscience ... simply means that
a physician will be accorded the right to choose whether to initiate or continue a course of
treatment that offends some deeply held personal beliefs.").
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professional's conscience dictates something that is not in accord with
those standards, the conscience must then be overridden.
241
Some contend that allowing the patient to have total control over
medical decisionmaking would demean the medical profession.
242
Yet, concerns about the integrity of the medical profession have not
been deemed sufficiently weighty to justify overriding patient auton-
omy in withdrawal and refusal of treatment cases.243 Indeed, it would
be difficult to argue that concerns of medical integrity should have
any bearing in the context of withdrawal and refusal; such an argu-
ment might mean that the integrity of the medical profession would
be upheld at the cost of patients' lives.2 44 Of course, as a practical
matter, physicians tend not to hide behind their professional con-
sciences in order to avoid treating patients; in fact, they seem to treat
even when their consciences dictate otherwise.
245
Maryland and Virginia have statutorily declared that physicians
need not provide treatment that they believe to be inappropriate. 246
However, the relevant statutes provide that the patient should be
transferred elsewhere rather than receive no care at all.247 Certainly,
241. See Levine, supra note 49, at 101 ("When the standard of care demands that a treat-
ment be provided for a certain medical condition under a certain set of circumstances,
barring any reasonable alternative or a transfer of the patient, the physician must provide
that treatment .... even though the provision of treatment would violate the physician's
conscience." (footnote omitted)).
242. See Daar, supra note 48, at 1245 (suggesting that leading doctors to see themselves
as "medical vending machines" would have bad effects (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Levine, supra note 49, at 83 ("By giving the patient sole authority to determine
whether treatment is futile, the shared decisionmaking model of the physician-patient rela-
tionship is reduced to little more than vending machine medicine." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
243. See Goldberg, supra note 166, at 1240 ("Another state interest relevant in with-
drawal or refusal of treatment cases is the ethical integrity of the medical profession....
Yet, the state interest in the medical profession's ethical integrity has not been sufficient to
override a particular individual's wishes in withdrawal or refusal of treatment cases.").
244. See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 51, at 27 (arguing that "support for professional
integrity" does not permit society to "grant[ ] the authority to make decisions about
whether someone else's life is worth prolonging").
245. Consider this example:
Fourteen hundred doctors and nurses at five major hospitals were asked about
their treatment of terminally ill patients: fully seventy percent of the resident
doctors said that they themselves overtreated such patients, against their own con-
science, and against what they knew to be the patients' interests and wishes. Four
times as many of those surveyed thought that doctors overtreated dying patients
as that they undertreated them.
RONALD DwORIuN, LiFE's DOMINION 183 (Vintage Books 1994) (1993).
246. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 5-611(a) (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990
(Michie 1994).
247. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 5-613(a); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2987; accordDaar,
supra note 58, at 231 ("[I]n fact, neither Virginia nor Maryland law permits a physician to
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this is reasonable if the patient can be transferred.248 If transfer is not
possible, 249  however, the physician may be forced to continue
treatment.
250
Suppose that treatment for a patient would clearly be futile. A
separate question is whether the decision not to treat must be dis-
cussed with the patient or the family. 25 1 Some commentators suggest
that because futility is a medical decision, no such discussions are re-
quired.252 That may be true insofar as the only concern is whether
treatment will ultimately be given. Yet, there are a number of possible
benefits that might be realized by talking the decision over with the
patient or the family. First, the discussion would accord respect to
patients or their families and might promote confidence in the medi-
cal profession. Second, the family might come to understand the in-
unilaterally terminate care against the wishes of the patient or surrogate."); Shiner, supra
note 42, at 845 ("The Virginia and Maryland health care decisions acts respond to this
concern by providing for transfer of the patient when physicians determine that requested
treatment is inappropriate.").
248. See Conservatorship of Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Ct. App. 1988) ("The
prevailing viewpoint among medical ethicists appears to be that a physician has the right to
refuse on personal moral grounds to follow a conservator's direction to withhold life-sus-
taining treatment, but must be willing to transfer the patient to another physician who will
follow the conservator's direction."); Veatch & Spicer, supra note 51, at 24 ("The first op-
tion [for a clinician who feels that some treatment violates his conscience] ... is to find
some other clinician who can provide the care without feeling personally violated. That is
clearly the wisest course, both from the point of view of the professional and that of the
patient.").
249. Shiner, supra note 42, at 845 (suggesting that "transferring a patient is not always
an available option").
250. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 5-613(a)(3) ("Pending the transfer, [a health
care provider who believes treatment is inappropriate shall] comply with an instruction of
a competent individual."); see also Veatch & Spicer, supra note 51, at 25 (suggesting that
treatment must be given, even if contrary to a physician's conscience, where transfer is not
possible); cf Grace Plaza, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 858 (App. Div. 1992) ("[N]o
medical professional may be compelled to violate his own medical ethics by being forced to
remove a feeding tube from an incompetent patient, unless the patient's conservator
proves the total unavailability of any physician willing to do so."), affd, 623 N.E.2d 513
(N.Y. 1993).
251. See Bennett, supra note 112, at 39 ("The AMA concludes that in the unusual circum-
stance where resuscitation is deemed medically futile by the attending physician, even if
previously requested by the patient, resuscitation may be withheld. However, this does not dis-
charge the physician's obligation to discuss these treatment decisions with the patient.");
Jecker & Pearlman, supra note 104, at 1143 ("[P]hysicians might note that even if they are
not under a duty to obtain permission from patients, it is incumbent on them to inform pa-
tients (or surrogates) when, and to explain to them why, futility judgments are made.").
252. J. Chris Hackler & F. Charles Hiller, Family Consent to Orders Not to Resuscitate: Recon-
sidering Hospital Policy, 264JAMA 1281, 1282 (1990). But see Bennett, supra note 112, at 45
("[F] utility decisions should be left to the physicians, although mandatory communication
and dialogue must exist between physician and patient, family, or surrogate.").
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evitability of death25 3 or, perhaps, might want to seek another opinion
before accepting the prognosis.2 5 4 Finally, there might be many fewer
patients and families demanding treatment if explanations were of-
fered by physicians.2 55 Studies indicate that in many cases where the
doctor believed resuscitation would not be appropriate, the patient
would have refused resuscitation had she been informed of the doc-
tor's opinion and given the opportunity to make that decision.25 6
Studies also indicate that patients themselves often want to have those
discussions.2 5 7
B. Mischaracterizations of Autonomy
Some commentators suggest that patient autonomy does not in-
clude the right to demand futile treatment, because patient autonomy
only includes the right to make a rightful medical decision. 25 18 While
the conclusion is correct, the analysis and justification are not, for
they could seriously undermine patient autonomy if the "rightful deci-
sions" category were too narrowly construed. 259 For example, one
might imagine a patient not being allowed to choose a plausible, less
invasive procedure because, according to the doctor, that was not a
rightful choice.
253. Bennett, supra note 112, at 42 ("Patients and their families have not had such an
education and may be dealing, for the first time, with life, its value, its quality, confronta-
tion with death, and the dilemmas of profound emotional and/or physical suffering.").
254. See Smith, supra note 53, at 19 ("Informing the patient and his family of the deci-
sion not to administer treatment on the grounds of futility helps patients and families cope
with the inevitability of death, and permits them to seek a second opinion or alternative
medical care." (footnotes omitted)); cf. Council on Ethical &Judicial Affairs, supra note 48,
at 1870 ("[W] hen there is adequate time ... the physician should inform the patient, or
... [her] surrogate, of the content of [a] DNR order, as well as the basis for its implemen-
tation .... The physician also should be prepared to discuss appropriate alternatives."
(footnote omitted)).
255. Cf StuartJ. Youngner, Editorial, Futility in Context, 264 JAMA 1295, 1296 (1990)
("Futile resuscitation may also be expected or demanded by patients and families because
they do not have all the facts or have not digested them.").
256. See Boozang, supra note 86, at 58 ("[P]atient studies indicate that most patients for
whom physicians would recommend against CPR would decline resuscitation if properly
informed and given the opportunity to choose."); cf. Bonanno, supra note 45, at 169
("[M]uch of the futility debate may be circumvented by improved doctor-patient commu-
nications about the goals of medical treatment.").
257. Cf Council on Ethical &Judicial Affairs, supra note 48, at 1869 ("[M]ost patients
wish to discuss their preferences about resuscitation with their physicians.").
258. See Smith, supra note 53, at 21 ("[P]atient rights of autonomy or self-determination
are abridged, not when there is a denial of opportunities to make any medical decision, but
rather when there is a denial of an opportunity to make 'a rightful medical decision.'").
259. SeeJohn F. Peppin, Physician Neutrality and Patient Autonomy in Advance Directive Deci-
sions, 11 IssuEs L. & MED. 13, 20 (1995) ("If autonomy is defined in terms of honoring only
choices that conform to a set standard, how is this autonomous?").
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Other commentators suggest that patient autonomy is not denied
by refusing to give patients futile treatment. Rather, they argue, au-
tonomy involves the right to be free from interference and thus does
not require that one receive desired, but futile, care.26° Yet, the same
argument could be used to justify one's not receiving treatment that
would effectively restore "normal" functioning. While these theorists
are correct that patient autonomy does not include the right to futile
treatment, their analyses are so potentially destructive of patient au-
tonomy that they must be avoided, even at great cost.
C. Humanitarian Concerns
Some commentators offer a much different analysis of why pa-
tients should receive futile treatment if they so desire. Basically, they
argue that such treatment should be offered if only to promote the
psychological welfare of the patient 261 or the patient's family by, for
example, helping them come to terms with their lOSS. 26 2
Consider someone in a permanent vegetative state. Although
bodily functions like heartbeat and pulmonary ventilation are main-
tained internally, there is no consciousness,263 appearances to the
260. See Myerberg, supra note 19, at 439-40 ("Autonomy is classically described as a nega-
tive-freedom from interference, not as a positive-freedom to receive or be given something.
When a person demands that all possible medical care be given to sustain life... she or he
is asking to be given something positive in the name of autonomy." (footnote omitted)).
But see Allan S. Brett & Laurence B. McCullough, When Patients Request Specific Interventions:
Defining the Limits of the Physician's Obligation, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1347, 1347 (1986)
("[T]he idea of positive rights in the physician-patient context-the right that something
be done-endorses the patient's right to select a particular intervention and implies a co-
existing obligation of the physician to make that intervention available. The principle of
respect for autonomy also justifies positive rights.").
261. Cf Boozang, supra note 86, at 70 ("The physician's primary concern for the dying
patient who demands futile CPR because she refuses to acknowledge her impending death
should be her psychological well-being. The patient's right to be the ultimate decision-
maker about her treatment cannot disappear simply because she is extremely ill or dying."
(footnote omitted)).
262. See Loewy & Carlson, supra note 93, at 429-30 ("To continue treatment that causes
the patient no suffering but that prolongs life for a reasonable length of time while those
concerned with the patient come to terms with the situation should not be morally offen-
sive."); Schneiderman et al., supra note 50, at 953 ("[A] physician may... [keep a patient
alive] on compassionate grounds, when temporary continuance of biologic life achieves
goals of the patient or family."); Schrode, supra note 44, at 1648 ("[lit is appropriate to
sustain the biological life of a permanently unconscious patient for a short time while the
family comes to terms with the diagnosis.").
263. See In re Guardianship of Myers, 610 N.E.2d 663, 670 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1993) ("The
diagnosis of persistent vegetative state is one that is abhorrent. It means that all higher
cognitive brain functions or processes of thought and communication are gone. It means
that only those body functions associated with the brain stem, that is, basic reflexes, re-
main."); In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 908 (Pa. 1996) ("The term 'vegetative state' describes: 'a
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contrary notwithstanding. 2" Further, such an individual has no
chance of returning to a conscious state.
265
Certainly, it might seem that keeping someone in a permanent
vegetative state alive until the family became reconciled to the pa-
tient's condition would be the least that one could do, especially be-
cause the treatment would hardly harm the patient.266 Yet, it would at
body which is functioning entirely in terms of its internal controls. It maintains tempera-
ture .... heart beat ... pulmonary ventilation .... digestive activity.... [and] reflex
activity .... But there is no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness of the
surroundings in a learned manner.'" (quoting Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 267 n.1 (1990) (quoting In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987)
(plurality opinion)))).
264. The American Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs and Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs describes the plight of the PVS patient as follows:
Despite an "alert demeanor," observation and examination repeatedly fail to
demonstrate coherent speech, evidence of comprehension of the words of exam-
iners or attendants, or any capacity to initiate or make consistently purposeful
movements. What movements do occur are largely confined to reflex withdrawals
or posturing in response to noxious or other external stimuli. Since neither vis-
ual nor auditory signals require cortical integrity to stimulate brief orienting re-
flexes, some vegetative patients may turn the head or dart the eyes toward a noise
or moving objects. However, PVS patients neither fixate on nor consistently fol-
low moving objects with the eyes, nor do they show other than startle responses to
loud stimuli. They blink when air movements stimulate the cornea, but not in the
presence of visual threats per se.
Council on Sci. Affairs & Council on Ethical &Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Persis-
tent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or Withhold Life Support, 263 JAMA 426, 427
(1990) (footnote omitted). A commentator vividly describes PVS patients:
Patients in a persistent vegetative state are harrowing to behold. They pres-
ent a much more disturbing picture than do patients in [a] coma, who appear to
be sleeping peacefully. Patients in a persistent vegetative state seem to sleep and
wake up as we do. They move, look around, make faces, and blink their eyes.
The neurologists tell us that all this activity is pure reflex, that nothing is getting
through to them. Yet, because we are so unaccustomed to the idea of a human
body moving without a mind to guide it, we have difficulty convincing ourselves
that the patient is not aware of herself and the world outside. The ambiguity
invites observers to project their own needs and concerns onto the patient. Thus,
the Quinlanjustices, horrified at the premature interruption of a young woman's
life, project their own sense of violation onto the insensate patient. The parent,
mourning the loss of the daughter he once knew, bitterly resents the claim that
anything of her is left in the unresponsive body that remains. And some of the
nurses and doctors, whose own lives are significantly bound up with caring for
brain-damaged patients, "see signs of intelligence where no such intelligence
exists."
Dresser, supra note 114, at 642-43 (footnotes omitted).
265. See Smith, supra note 53, at 4 ("A patient diagnosed as being in a PVS has no
chance of regaining consciousness or returning to a sapient existence.").
266. See Massie, supra note 201, at 204 ("Anyone suffering a total loss of consciousness is
... not 'burdened' by invasive medical procedures, because, so far as we can ascertain, the
patient has no sensations of pain and certainly no awareness of any dignitary interest at
stake.").
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best be ironic to allow psychological concerns to justify futile treat-
ment, but not to justify possibly effective treatment that would provide
a patient's only possible hope for survival. The implicit priorities of
such a policy are simply unacceptable.
IV. CONCLUSION
In re Baby K brought the issue of medical futility to the nation's
attention. Arguably, the case should be understood as an incorrect
reading of the legislative intent behind EMTALA. This incorrect
reading can be rectified by Congress's passing a clarifying amend-
ment. Yet, the Baby K district court's reading of the ADA could have
far-reaching implications for the concept of medical futility, because
the court's interpretation would basically gut the concept.
The concept of medical futility must be robust enough to do
more than just exclude treatments that would either have no effect or
would be refused by the patient anyway. Given the advancements in
medical technology and the possible opt-out provisions built into law,
a failure to have a somewhat robust notion of futility may mean that
individuals who are completely brain dead will be kept "alive" for
weeks, or that individuals with no chance of having consciousness re-
stored will be kept alive indefinitely.
Nonetheless, the tendency in the medical profession and society
at large to undervalue the lives of those with disabilities militates
against having a very robust notion of medical futility. Reasonable
people may differ about what price is too dear for the possible exten-
sion of conscious life, and it would be inappropriate to imply that, for
example, additional days of conscious life are simply of no value. Fur-
ther, any justification for choosing a particular concept of futility must
neither undermine patient autonomy nor imply that patients have the
right to decide whatever they want, including, for example, the defini-
tions of futility and death.
Futility discussions must be situated in the context of a society in
which there are scarce resources and in which current treatment prac-
tices sometimes involve denying patients their only realistic chance of
sustaining conscious life. The point is not that futility should be de-
fined, even in part, in terms of available resources or the costs of treat-
ment. Rather, the point is that no sensible policy would
simultaneously hold that nonbeneficial treatments must be given if
desired, but that possibly beneficial treatments may be withheld. To
suggest that futility must be a patient-centered concept, but that indi-
viduals may permissibly be denied the only treatments that may save
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their lives, is to endorse a counterintuitive and positively harmful
policy.
Commentators must take seriously the notion that the focus of
their views on futility-e.g., humanitarian concerns and a desire to
support patient autonomy-must be reflected in other areas where
treatment decisions are made. Otherwise, the view adopted may not
only reflect an unwise policy but a position that implicitly undermines
the value of human nature itself.
